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Lemma 7.3 — price bounds at every equilibrium of the completed market

Proved
LinearChoresCLS.lemma_7_3

by iris · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

choresclscompetitive-equilibriumfisher-marketp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let I=(A,c,ε)I=(A,c,\varepsilon)I=(A,c,ε) with n≥1n\ge1n≥1, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, and let (p,z)(p,z)(p,z) be a competitive equilibrium of the completed market f(I)f(I)f(I). Then:

  1. (1+t)−3≤pℓ≤(1+t)3(1+t)^{-3}\le p_\ell\le(1+t)^3(1+t)−3≤pℓ​≤(1+t)3 for every chore ℓ\ellℓ;
  2. for every chain (j,j′)(j,j')(j,j′), layer kkk and sign σ∈{+,−}\sigma\in\{+,-\}σ∈{+,−},
S(j,j′),k p(j,j′),kσ<B(j,j′),k,p(j,j′),kσ<pmax⁡ ⟹ ∑a∈Nout,kσBa<S(j,j′),k p(j,j′),kσ;S_{(j,j'),k}\,p^\sigma_{(j,j'),k}<B_{(j,j'),k},\qquad p^\sigma_{(j,j'),k}<p_{\max}\ \Longrightarrow\ \sum_{a\in N^\sigma_{\mathrm{out},k}}B_a<S_{(j,j'),k}\,p^\sigma_{(j,j'),k};S(j,j′),k​p(j,j′),kσ​<B(j,j′),k​,p(j,j′),kσ​<pmax​ ⟹ a∈Nout,kσ​∑​Ba​<S(j,j′),k​p(j,j′),kσ​;
  1. p0≤pj≤(1+t)p0p_0\le p_j\le(1+t)p_0p0​≤pj​≤(1+t)p0​ for every j∈[n]j\in[n]j∈[n].

These bounds prepare the exclusion of undesignated choices (Lemma 7.4) and the price conditions of every gadget.

Formalization Note Nout,kσN^\sigma_{\mathrm{out},k}Nout,kσ​ are the agents outside the layer-kkk gadget with positive allocation of p(j,j′),kσp^\sigma_{(j,j'),k}p(j,j′),kσ​; pmax⁡p_{\max}pmax​ is the largest price over all chores.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: chain (j, j′), layer k, sign σ ∈ {+, −} → π : Pair n, k : Fin L, σ : Bool (true = +); reason: index conventions; same instances
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LinearChoresCLS_CompletedMarket

open Finset NetworkEquilibriumCLS.LinearNash
Formal statement
namespace LinearChoresCLS

/-- **Lemma 7.3 (Price bounds)** (arXiv:2611.06589, held version sha256 85d34a9e…, p.34). Let
`(p, z)` be an equilibrium of the completed market `f(I)` (`n ≥ 1`, `ε > 0`, parameters (7.1)).
(1) `(1 + t)^{−3} ≤ p_ℓ ≤ (1 + t)³` for every chore `ℓ`. (2) For every chain `(j, j′)`, layer `k`
and sign `σ ∈ {+, −}`: `S_{(j,j′),k} p^σ_{(j,j′),k} < B_{(j,j′),k}`, and if `p^σ_{(j,j′),k} < p_max`
then `∑_{a ∈ N^σ_{out,k}} B_a < S_{(j,j′),k} p^σ_{(j,j′),k}` (7.5). (3) `p₀ ≤ p_j ≤ (1 + t)p₀` for
every `j ∈ [n]`.

**Formalization Note.** `N^σ_{out,k}` (`outUsers`) are the agents outside the layer-`k` gadget
with `z_{a, p^σ} > 0`; `p_max` is the largest price over all chores; `σ = true` is `+`. -/
theorem lemma_7_3 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (P : Quadratic n) (ε : ℚ) (hε : 0 < ε)
    (p : Chore n (chainLength P ε) → ℝ) (z : Agent n (chainLength P ε) → Chore n (chainLength P ε) → ℝ)
    (hCE : (completedMarket P ε).IsCE p z) :
    (∀ ℓ, ((1 + tParam P ε) ^ 3)⁻¹ ≤ p ℓ ∧ p ℓ ≤ (1 + tParam P ε) ^ 3) ∧
    (∀ (π : Pair n) (k : Fin (chainLength P ε)) (σ : Bool),
      gadgetSupply P (tParam P ε) π k.val * p (Sum.inr (π, k, σ)) <
          gadgetEarn P (tParam P ε) π k.val ∧
      (p (Sum.inr (π, k, σ)) < pmax p →
        ∑ a ∈ outUsers z π k σ, (completedMarket P ε).earn a <
          gadgetSupply P (tParam P ε) π k.val * p (Sum.inr (π, k, σ)))) ∧
    (∀ i : Fin n, p (Sum.inl 0) ≤ p (Sum.inl i.succ) ∧
      p (Sum.inl i.succ) ≤ (1 + tParam P ε) * p (Sum.inl 0)) := by sorry

end LinearChoresCLS
Source
Liu–Ma–Tao–Yang–Zheng, Competitive Equilibrium for Linear Chores is CLS-complete, arXiv:2611.06589 (held version, sha256 85d34a9e048d151ecff70a8614b9c2dd44307d5cf60faba74d14b2dd7eedc0b5), Lemma 7.3, Eq. (7.5), p.34
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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