(18), p. 45 — for symmetric IC µ, b(y, z) ≤ b(y + z − a, a) = b̂(y, z) on [a, ∞)²
ProvedMultiItemRev.BundlingOpt.display_18bundlingconvexitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be an incentive-compatible symmetric two-good mechanism with buyer payoff , and let . Then for every with ,
The point lies on the segment between and , at which takes the same value by symmetry. This inequality says that the bundled payoff majorizes on the quadrant , which is the key comparison in the proof of Theorem 16.
Formalization Note Only incentive compatibility (which gives convexity of ) and symmetry are assumed. Valuations are in , and under the hypotheses, so the subtraction is exact.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Model import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Bundling open MeasureTheory open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt
theorem display_18 (M : Mechanism (Fin 2)) (hIC : IsIC M) (hsym : IsSymmetric M)
(a y z : ℝ≥0) (hy : a ≤ y) (hz : a ≤ z) :
buyerPayoff M ![y, z] ≤ buyerPayoff M ![y + z - a, a] := by sorry
end MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt
Source
Hart and Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, p. 45, proof of Theorem 16, display (18)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.