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YukonModule.VCVio.CryptoFoundations.SymmEncAlg.part0

Definition
Yukon_b2b98f746341a120449778db

by yukon · Sep 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

better-codes

Source module VCVio.CryptoFoundations.SymmEncAlg.

Definition code
/-
Copyright (c) 2024 Devon Tuma. All rights reserved.
Released under Apache 2.0 license as described in the file LICENSE.
Authors: Devon Tuma, Quang Dao
-/

module
public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_2e7e800d480cc4c5ab2a0a15

public import Definitions.Def_Yukon_3ca8dea642d23c4bd0e25cee



public import Batteries.Control.OptionT
public import Mathlib.Probability.Distributions.Uniform
public import Mathlib.Data.Vector.Defs
public import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Card
public import Init
public import Mathlib.CategoryTheory.Monad.Types
public import Mathlib.Order.CompleteLattice.Basic
public import Mathlib.Probability.ProbabilityMassFunction.Monad
public import Batteries.Control.AlternativeMonad
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Multivariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Data.PFunctor.Univariate.Basic
public import Mathlib.Tactic.Common
public import Mathlib.Init
public import Lean.Message
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint.Basic
public import Batteries.Tactic.Lint
public import Mathlib.Algebra.Polynomial.Eval.Defs
public import Mathlib.Algebra.MvPolynomial.Eval
public import Mathlib.Topology.Algebra.InfiniteSum.ENNReal
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_2e7e800d480cc4c5ab2a0a15
meta import Definitions.Def_Yukon_3ca8dea642d23c4bd0e25cee
set_option backward.isDefEq.respectTransparency.types false
/-!
# Symmetric Encryption Schemes

This file defines `SymmEncAlg m M K C`, a monad-generic symmetric encryption scheme with
message space `M`, key space `K`, and ciphertext space `C`.

The struct follows the same pattern as `AsymmEncAlg`, `KEMScheme`, `MacAlg`, etc.: it is
parameterized by an ambient monad `m` and uses plain `Type` parameters. Asymptotic security
statements are expressed externally by quantifying over a family
`(sp : ℕ) → SymmEncAlg m (M sp) (K sp) (C sp)`.

Perfect secrecy is captured by `perfectSecrecyAt` (the canonical independence form), with
equivalent formulations `perfectSecrecyPosteriorEqPriorAt` (cross-multiplied posterior/prior
form) and `perfectSecrecyJointFactorizationAt` (factorization with named marginals); the
`_iff_` lemmas record the equivalences. `perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors` is the strong PMF-level
quantification, equivalent to `ciphertextRowsEqualAt` over finite message spaces.
-/

@[expose] public section

universe u

open OracleComp ENNReal

/-- A monad-generic symmetric encryption scheme over an ambient monad `m`, with message
space `M`, key space `K`, and ciphertext space `C`. -/
structure SymmEncAlg (m : Type → Type u) [Monad m] (M K C : Type) where
  /-- Sample a key. -/
  keygen : m K
  /-- Encrypt a message under a key. -/
  encrypt : K → M → m C
  /-- Decrypt a ciphertext under a key, returning `none` on failure. -/
  decrypt : K → C → m (Option M)

namespace SymmEncAlg

variable {m : Type → Type u} [Monad m] {M K C : Type}

/-- Round-trip experiment: sample a key, encrypt `msg`, then decrypt; used to state
correctness via `Complete`. -/
def CompleteExp (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (msg : M) : m (Option M) := do
  let k ← encAlg.keygen
  let σ ← encAlg.encrypt k msg
  encAlg.decrypt k σ

/-- An encryption scheme is complete if decryption recovers every message with
probability `1`. -/
def Complete [MonadLiftT m PMF] [LawfulMonadLiftT m PMF] (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ msg : M, Pr[= msg | encAlg.CompleteExp msg] = 1

section perfectSecrecy

/-- Joint message/ciphertext experiment used to express perfect secrecy. -/
def PerfectSecrecyExp (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) : m (M × C) := do
  let msg' ← mgen
  let k ← encAlg.keygen
  return (msg', ← encAlg.encrypt k msg')

/-- Ciphertext marginal induced by the perfect-secrecy experiment. -/
def PerfectSecrecyCipherExp (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) : m C :=
  Prod.snd <$> encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen

/-- Ciphertext experiment conditioned on a fixed message. -/
def PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (msg : M) : m C := do
  let k ← encAlg.keygen
  encAlg.encrypt k msg

lemma PerfectSecrecyExp_eq_bind [LawfulMonad m] (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) :
    encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen =
      mgen >>= fun msg => (msg, ·) <$> encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg := by
  simp [PerfectSecrecyExp, PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp, monad_norm]

lemma PerfectSecrecyCipherExp_eq_bind [LawfulMonad m] (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) :
    encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen =
      mgen >>= fun msg => encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg := by
  simp [PerfectSecrecyCipherExp, PerfectSecrecyExp_eq_bind, monad_norm]

variable [MonadLiftT m PMF] [LawfulMonadLiftT m PMF]
  [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m]

omit [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m] in
lemma probOutput_PerfectSecrecyExp_eq_mul_cipherGivenMsg [LawfulMonad m]
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) (msg : M) (σ : C) :
    Pr[= (msg, σ) | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen] =
      Pr[= msg | mgen] *
      Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg] := by
  have : DecidableEq M := Classical.decEq M
  rw [encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp_eq_bind mgen, probOutput_bind_eq_tsum,
    tsum_eq_single msg fun msg' hmsg' => by simp [Ne.symm hmsg']]
  simp

omit [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m] in
lemma probOutput_PerfectSecrecyCipherExp_eq_tsum [LawfulMonad m]
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) (mgen : m M) (σ : C) :
    Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen] =
      ∑' msg : M,
        Pr[= msg | mgen] *
        Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg] := by
  rw [encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp_eq_bind mgen, probOutput_bind_eq_tsum]

/-- Strong perfect secrecy: ciphertexts are independent of messages
for every prior distribution on messages (PMF-level quantification). -/
def perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ (μ : PMF M) (msg : M) (σ : C),
    let row := fun x : M => Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp x]
    μ msg * row msg = μ msg * (∑' x : M, μ x * row x)

/-- Equivalent channel-style formulation: every message induces the same ciphertext
distribution. -/
def ciphertextRowsEqualAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ (msg₀ msg₁ : M) (σ : C),
    Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg₀] =
      Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg₁]

omit [LawfulMonadLiftT m PMF] [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m]
    in
/-- Over a finite message space, strong perfect secrecy is equivalent to all ciphertext
rows being equal. -/
theorem perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors_iff_ciphertextRowsEqualAt
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) [Finite M] :
    encAlg.perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors ↔ encAlg.ciphertextRowsEqualAt := by
  have : Fintype M := Fintype.ofFinite M
  constructor
  · intro hAll msg₀ msg₁ σ
    have : Nonempty M := ⟨msg₀⟩
    let μ : PMF M := PMF.uniformOfFintype M
    let row := fun x : M => Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp x]
    have key : ∀ x : M, (Fintype.card M : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ * row x =
        (Fintype.card M : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ * ∑' y : M, μ y * row y := fun x => by
      simpa [perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors, μ, row, PMF.uniformOfFintype_apply] using hAll μ x σ
    exact (ENNReal.mul_right_inj (ENNReal.inv_ne_zero.2 (by simp))
      (ENNReal.inv_ne_top.2 (by exact_mod_cast Fintype.card_ne_zero))).1
      ((key msg₀).trans (key msg₁).symm)
  · intro hRows μ msg σ
    simp only [hRows _ msg σ, ENNReal.tsum_mul_right, μ.tsum_coe, one_mul]

/-- Standard perfect secrecy expressed as independence:
`Pr[(M, C)] = Pr[M] * Pr[C]`. -/
def perfectSecrecyAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ (mgen : m M) (msg : M) (σ : C),
    Pr[= (msg, σ) | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen] =
      Pr[= msg | mgen] * Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen]

/-- Posterior-equals-prior form, written in cross-multiplied form to avoid division. -/
def perfectSecrecyPosteriorEqPriorAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ (mgen : m M) (msg : M) (σ : C),
    Pr[= (msg, σ) | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen] =
      Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen] * Pr[= msg | mgen]

/-- Joint-factorization form (same mathematical statement as independence, with explicit
named priors/marginals). -/
def perfectSecrecyJointFactorizationAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) : Prop :=
  ∀ (mgen : m M) (msg : M) (σ : C),
    Pr[= (msg, σ) | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyExp mgen] =
      Pr[= msg | mgen] * Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen]

omit [LawfulMonadLiftT m PMF] [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m]
    in
lemma perfectSecrecyAt_iff_posteriorEqPriorAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) :
    encAlg.perfectSecrecyAt ↔ encAlg.perfectSecrecyPosteriorEqPriorAt := by
  simp [perfectSecrecyAt, perfectSecrecyPosteriorEqPriorAt, mul_comm]

omit [LawfulMonadLiftT m PMF] [MonadLiftT m SetM] [EvalDistCompatible m]
    in
lemma perfectSecrecyAt_iff_jointFactorizationAt (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) :
    encAlg.perfectSecrecyAt ↔ encAlg.perfectSecrecyJointFactorizationAt := Iff.rfl

/-- Core uniformity lemma: uniform keygen plus unique key per (message, ciphertext) pair
implies every (message, ciphertext) conditional has probability `(card K)⁻¹`.
Both Shannon theorems follow from this. -/
theorem cipherGivenMsg_uniform_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) [Fintype K]
    (deterministicEnc : ∀ (k : K) (msg : M),
      ∃ c, support (encAlg.encrypt k msg) = {c})
    (hKeyUniform : ∀ k : K, Pr[= k | encAlg.keygen] =
        (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹)
    (hUniqueKey : ∀ msg : M, ∀ c : C, ∃! k : K,
        k ∈ support encAlg.keygen ∧
        c ∈ support (encAlg.encrypt k msg))
    (msg : M) (σ : C) :
    Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp msg] =
      (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ := by
  obtain ⟨k0, hk0, hk0uniq⟩ := hUniqueKey msg σ
  have henc_one : Pr[= σ | encAlg.encrypt k0 msg] = 1 := by
    obtain ⟨c0, hc0⟩ := deterministicEnc k0 msg
    obtain rfl : σ = c0 := by simpa [hc0] using hk0.2
    exact probOutput_eq_one_iff.2 ⟨probFailure_of_liftM_PMF _, by simpa using hc0⟩
  simp only [PerfectSecrecyCipherGivenMsgExp, probOutput_bind_eq_tsum]
  rw [tsum_eq_single k0 fun k hkne => mul_eq_zero.2 <|
    (not_and_or.1 fun h => hkne (hk0uniq k h)).imp
      probOutput_eq_zero_of_not_mem_support probOutput_eq_zero_of_not_mem_support]
  simp [hKeyUniform k0, henc_one]

theorem ciphertextRowsEqualAt_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C) [Fintype K]
    (deterministicEnc : ∀ (k : K) (msg : M),
      ∃ c, support (encAlg.encrypt k msg) = {c})
    (hKeyUniform : ∀ k : K, Pr[= k | encAlg.keygen] =
        (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹)
    (hUniqueKey : ∀ msg : M, ∀ c : C, ∃! k : K,
        k ∈ support encAlg.keygen ∧
        c ∈ support (encAlg.encrypt k msg)) :
    encAlg.ciphertextRowsEqualAt := by
  intro msg₀ msg₁ σ
  rw [encAlg.cipherGivenMsg_uniform_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
        deterministicEnc hKeyUniform hUniqueKey msg₀ σ,
      encAlg.cipherGivenMsg_uniform_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
        deterministicEnc hKeyUniform hUniqueKey msg₁ σ]

/-- Constructive Shannon direction: if keygen is uniform and each `(message, ciphertext)`
pair is realized by a unique key in support, then perfect secrecy holds.

`deterministicEnc` asserts encryption is deterministic in distribution
(singleton support for each fixed `(key, message)`). -/
theorem perfectSecrecyAt_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey [LawfulMonad m]
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C)
    [Fintype K]
    (deterministicEnc : ∀ (k : K) (msg : M),
      ∃ c, support (encAlg.encrypt k msg) = {c}) :
    ((∀ k : K, Pr[= k | encAlg.keygen] =
        (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹) ∧
    (∀ msg : M, ∀ c : C, ∃! k : K,
        k ∈ support encAlg.keygen ∧
        c ∈ support (encAlg.encrypt k msg))) →
    encAlg.perfectSecrecyAt := by
  intro ⟨hKeyUniform, hUniqueKey⟩
  have hCipherGiven_uniform := encAlg.cipherGivenMsg_uniform_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
    deterministicEnc hKeyUniform hUniqueKey
  have hCipher_uniform : ∀ (mgen : m M) (σ : C),
      Pr[= σ | encAlg.PerfectSecrecyCipherExp mgen] = (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹ := by
    intro mgen σ
    rw [encAlg.probOutput_PerfectSecrecyCipherExp_eq_tsum mgen σ]
    simp_rw [hCipherGiven_uniform _ σ, ENNReal.tsum_mul_right,
      tsum_probOutput_of_liftM_PMF mgen, one_mul]
  intro mgen msg σ
  rw [encAlg.probOutput_PerfectSecrecyExp_eq_mul_cipherGivenMsg mgen msg σ,
    hCipherGiven_uniform msg σ, hCipher_uniform mgen σ]

/-- Constructive Shannon direction for all priors: uniform keys plus uniqueness
imply perfect secrecy for all prior distributions on messages. -/
theorem perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
    (encAlg : SymmEncAlg m M K C)
    [Finite M] [Fintype K]
    (deterministicEnc : ∀ (k : K) (msg : M),
      ∃ c, support (encAlg.encrypt k msg) = {c}) :
    ((∀ k : K, Pr[= k | encAlg.keygen] =
        (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞)⁻¹) ∧
    (∀ msg : M, ∀ c : C, ∃! k : K,
        k ∈ support encAlg.keygen ∧
        c ∈ support (encAlg.encrypt k msg))) →
    encAlg.perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors := by
  intro ⟨hKeyUniform, hUniqueKey⟩
  exact (encAlg.perfectSecrecyAtAllPriors_iff_ciphertextRowsEqualAt).2
    (encAlg.ciphertextRowsEqualAt_of_uniformKey_of_uniqueKey
      deterministicEnc hKeyUniform hUniqueKey)

end perfectSecrecy

end SymmEncAlg


Source
https://github.com/Verified-zkEVM/VCV-io/blob/446baa72bb7d4296d6f6b7015fd6c15ca9c678b7/VCVio/CryptoFoundations/SymmEncAlg.lean yukon-proof-operation:6007b8c8b45c9243e2cacf033761e3872f7e2038f601acba3ff8a9b241ad5fe3 [yukon-proof-receipt:eyJ2IjoxLCJtYXJrZXIiOiJ5dWtvbi1wcm9vZi1vcGVyYXRpb246NjAwN2I4YzhiNDVjOTI0M2UyY2FjZjAzMzc2MWUzODcyZjdlMjAzOGY2MDFhY2JhM2ZmOGE5YjI0MWFkNWZlMyIsImhhc2giOiJjYmFmMjQ5MTRkN2Y5ZDJhYTUxOTRhODQxOGIyZTQyYjkwZGQ4M2FjNzAyOTBjOTgxNzMwOTcwYjdmNTE1MTBlIiwia2luZCI6ImRlZmluaXRpb24iLCJ0YXJnZXQiOiJZdWtvbl9iMmI5OGY3NDYzNDFhMTIwNDQ5Nzc4ZGIiLCJlbnZpcm9ubWVudCI6eyJtYXRobGliUmV2IjoiMGRmNDQ0YTM2MGVhYTYwYWI4YzExZGNhNTFhODZhZjY5Mjk1NTQ3NCIsInRvb2xjaGFpbiI6ImxlYW5wcm92ZXIvbGVhbjQ6djQuMzMuMSJ9LCJ0YWciOiJiZXR0ZXItY29kZXMifQ]

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