Section 3, p. 66 — the induced direct mechanism π′ generates the same allocation, V(π′) = W(π, σ)
ProvedMyersonBargaining.Revelation.induced_V_eq_Wmechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle
Let be a Bayesian collective choice problem, let be a choice mechanism on nonempty finite response sets , and let be response plans. Define the direct mechanism
Then is a choice mechanism on the standard response sets , and
Thus honest reporting under gives every type of every player the same expected payoff as following the plans under . This is the first half of the proof of in Theorem 2.
Formalization Note The paper states this for a response-plan equilibrium ; the identity uses only that the are response plans, and the theorem is stated in that generality. The claim that satisfies (2), implicit in the paper's "equivalent choice mechanism", is stated explicitly.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
theorem induced_V_eq_W (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) {S : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (S i)] (π : C → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (σ : ∀ i, S i → A i → ℝ)
(hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hσ : ∀ i, IsResponsePlan (σ i)) :
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism (induced π σ) ∧ MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.V G (induced π σ) = W G π σ := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 66, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.