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Section 3, p. 66 — the induced direct mechanism π′ generates the same allocation, V(π′) = W(π, σ)

Proved
MyersonBargaining.Revelation.induced_V_eq_W

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

mechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle

Let (C,A1,…,An,U1,…,Un,P)(C,A_1,\dots,A_n,U_1,\dots,U_n,P)(C,A1​,…,An​,U1​,…,Un​,P) be a Bayesian collective choice problem, let π\piπ be a choice mechanism on nonempty finite response sets S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​, and let σ1,…,σn\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_nσ1​,…,σn​ be response plans. Define the direct mechanism

π′(c∣α)=∑s∈S1×⋯×Snπ(c∣s)∏i=1nσi(si∣αi).\pi'(c\mid\alpha)=\sum_{s\in S_1\times\cdots\times S_n}\pi(c\mid s)\prod_{i=1}^n\sigma_i(s_i\mid\alpha_i).π′(c∣α)=s∈S1​×⋯×Sn​∑​π(c∣s)i=1∏n​σi​(si​∣αi​).

Then π′\pi'π′ is a choice mechanism on the standard response sets A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​, and

V(π′)=W(π,σ1,…,σn).V(\pi')=W(\pi,\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n).V(π′)=W(π,σ1​,…,σn​).

Thus honest reporting under π′\pi'π′ gives every type of every player the same expected payoff as following the plans σ\sigmaσ under π\piπ. This is the first half of the proof of F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗ in Theorem 2.

Formalization Note The paper states this for a response-plan equilibrium σ\sigmaσ; the identity uses only that the σi\sigma_iσi​ are response plans, and the theorem is stated in that generality. The claim that π′\pi'π′ satisfies (2), implicit in the paper's "equivalent choice mechanism", is stated explicitly.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

theorem induced_V_eq_W (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) {S : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
    [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)] (π : C → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (σ : ∀ i, S i → A i → ℝ)
    (hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hσ : ∀ i, IsResponsePlan (σ i)) :
    MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism (induced π σ) ∧ MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.V G (induced π σ) = W G π σ := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 66, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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