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Theorem 7.2 — exact second-price throttling equilibria are FIXP-complete, and FIXP-hard with at most three distinct positive bids per item

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FixpReciprocal.Supplement.theorem_7_2

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsautobiddingcomputational-complexityfixpp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

An instance has nnn bidders, mmm items, nonnegative rational bids b=(bℓ,s)b=(b_{\ell,s})b=(bℓ,s​) and positive rational budgets M=(Mℓ)M=(M_\ell)M=(Mℓ​). Bidder ℓ\ellℓ participates in all mmm auctions with probability αℓ∈[0,1]\alpha_\ell\in[0,1]αℓ​∈[0,1], independently of the other bidders; each item is sold once in a second-price auction among the participants, a sole participant pays zero, and ties are resolved by a fixed priority order. Writing ℓ≻sℓ′\ell\succ_s\ell'ℓ≻s​ℓ′ when ℓ\ellℓ precedes ℓ′\ell'ℓ′ in decreasing bid order on item sss (with the priority), the conditional payment is

Cℓ(α−ℓ)=∑s=1m ∑ℓ′: ℓ≻sℓ′bℓ′,s αℓ′∏ℓ′′≠ℓ, ℓ′′≻sℓ′(1−αℓ′′),C_\ell(\alpha_{-\ell})=\sum_{s=1}^m\ \sum_{\ell':\,\ell\succ_s\ell'} b_{\ell',s}\,\alpha_{\ell'}\prod_{\ell''\ne\ell,\ \ell''\succ_s\ell'}(1-\alpha_{\ell''}),Cℓ​(α−ℓ​)=s=1∑m​ ℓ′:ℓ≻s​ℓ′∑​bℓ′,s​αℓ′​ℓ′′=ℓ, ℓ′′≻s​ℓ′∏​(1−αℓ′′​),

and Pℓ(α)=αℓCℓ(α−ℓ)P_\ell(\alpha)=\alpha_\ell C_\ell(\alpha_{-\ell})Pℓ​(α)=αℓ​Cℓ​(α−ℓ​). A vector α∈[0,1]n\alpha\in[0,1]^nα∈[0,1]n is an exact second-price throttling equilibrium (Definition 7.1) if for every ℓ\ellℓ: Pℓ(α)≤MℓP_\ell(\alpha)\le M_\ellPℓ​(α)≤Mℓ​, and Pℓ(α)<Mℓ  ⟹  αℓ=1P_\ell(\alpha)<M_\ell\implies\alpha_\ell=1Pℓ​(α)<Mℓ​⟹αℓ​=1.

Theorem.

  1. Given binary-encoded rational bids b∈Q≥0n×mb\in\mathbb Q_{\ge0}^{n\times m}b∈Q≥0n×m​ and budgets M∈Q>0nM\in\mathbb Q_{>0}^nM∈Q>0n​, finding an exact second-price throttling equilibrium α∈[0,1]n\alpha\in[0,1]^nα∈[0,1]n is FIXP-complete.
  2. The problem remains FIXP-hard when each item has at most three positive bids and these bids are pairwise distinct.

Under the second restriction ties between positive bids never occur, so the hardness does not depend on the tie-breaking rule for positive bids.

Formalization Note The problem is the published throttlingProblemOn, with the priority fixed to bidder index order (IndexPriority); the sparse class is ThreeDistinctBids.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: ties are resolved by a fixed priority order → IndexPriority: prio = [0, 1, …, n−1], a lower bidder index has higher priority, the same order on every item; reason: the input of Theorem 7.2 is only (b, M), so the priority is not instance data; any fixed order is the index order after relabelling the bidders
  • encoding: input (b, M) only → ThrottleData also encodes n, m and the priority list, which IndexPriority forces to equal List.range n; reason: the published encoding carries these fields; they are determined by the bids and add no instances
  • encoding: conditional payment C_ℓ(α_{−ℓ}) of (32) and P_ℓ(α) = α_ℓ C_ℓ(α_{−ℓ}) → condPayment: the expectation, over independent participation of the other bidders, of ℓ's second-price payments when ℓ participates (ℓ pays the highest other participating bid, 0 if alone, on each item it wins under bid order with index priority); reason: summing over the highest-ranked other participant ℓ' below ℓ gives exactly the terms b_{ℓ',s} α_{ℓ'} ∏_{ℓ''≠ℓ, ℓ''≻s ℓ'} (1 − α{ℓ''}) of (32)
  • encoding: hardness holds even when each item has at most three positive bids and these bids are pairwise distinct → second conjunct FIXPHard (throttlingProblemOn (IndexPriority ∧ ThreeDistinctBids)); reason: 'hardness holds' for the restricted problem is FIXP-hardness of the problem on that instance class
  • encoding: bidders ℓ ∈ [n], items s ∈ [m] → Fin nb, Fin ng (0-based); WellFormed: nb rows of ng nonnegative rational bids, nb positive rational budgets; reason: Lean indexing; the same instances
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_FIXPComplete
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_Throttling
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_Supplement_Classes
Formal statement
namespace FixpReciprocal.Supplement

open ExactAutobid.Equilibria

/-- **Theorem 7.2 (Second-price throttling).** Given binary-encoded rational bids `b ∈ ℚ_{≥0}^{n×m}`
and budgets `M ∈ ℚ_{>0}^n`, the problem of finding an exact second-price throttling equilibrium
`α ∈ [0, 1]^n` is FIXP-complete. Hardness holds even when each item has at most three positive bids
and these bids are pairwise distinct.

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 7.2, p.31; §7.1 and Definition 7.1, p.30, (32)–(34).

**Formalization Note.** The problem is the published `throttlingProblemOn`, whose `condPayment` is
the conditional payment `C_ℓ(α_{−ℓ})` of (32) and whose `IsThrottlingEq` is `α ∈ [0, 1]^n` with
(33)–(34). The fixed tie-breaking priority is the bidder index order (`IndexPriority`). The second
conjunct is FIXP-hardness of the problem restricted to `ThreeDistinctBids`. -/
theorem theorem_7_2 :
    FIXPComplete (throttlingProblemOn IndexPriority) ∧
      FIXPHard (throttlingProblemOn (fun d => IndexPriority d ∧ ThreeDistinctBids d)) := by sorry

end FixpReciprocal.Supplement
Source
Shimizu, FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions (STOC 2027 submission, sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 7.2, p.31 (PDF p.33); §7.1 and Definition 7.1, p.30 (PDF p.32), (32)–(34)

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