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Theorem 2.6 — for two agents every EFX allocation is 2/3-MMS

Proved
StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds.theorem_2_6

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

efxfair-divisionmaximin-sharep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let two agents have additive valuations v1,v2v_1,v_2v1​,v2​ with non-negative values over a finite set MMM of goods, and let μi\mu_iμi​ denote agent iii's maximin share for two bundles. If (A1,A2)(A_1,A_2)(A1​,A2​) is an allocation of MMM that is EFX (only goods of positive value to the envious agent are removed), then

vi(Ai) ≥ 23 μifor i=1,2.v_i(A_i)\ \ge\ \tfrac23\,\mu_i\qquad\text{for } i=1,2.vi​(Ai​) ≥ 32​μi​for i=1,2.

This is the worst-case maximin-share guarantee of an EFX allocation for two agents, which the paper attributes to Proposition 3.3 of Amanatidis, Birmpas and Markakis. Theorem 4.7 shows that equilibria of always-EFX mechanisms do strictly better than this generic bound.

Formalization Note The tightness sentence after Theorem 2.6 ("for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there exists an EFX allocation that is not (2/3+δ)(2/3+\delta)(2/3+δ)-MMS") is not part of this statement.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_EFXTwoThirds_Setting
Formal statement
namespace StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds

/-- Theorem 2.6 (p. 5): for two agents with additive non-negative valuations, every EFX
allocation is a 2/3-MMS allocation. -/
theorem theorem_2_6 {m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i g, 0 ≤ v i g)
    (A : Fin 2 → Finset (Fin m)) (hA : IsAllocation A) (hEFX : IsEFX v A) :
    StrategicAlloc.EFXFour.IsApproxMMS (2 / 3) v A := by sorry

end StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds
Source
Amanatidis et al., Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents, arXiv:2109.08644v2, p. 5, Theorem 2.6
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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