Case 2.1, OA pp. 26–31 — optimal outcomes for intermediate independent repair costs
ProvedRightRepair.Equilibrium.case_2_1equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1repair-pricingright-to-repair
Suppose . The proof's Case 2.1 gives the no-repair outcome when , the partial-repair outcome when , and the full-repair outcome when . In each regime, the displayed new-product price, repair price, used-product price, and repair probability form an equilibrium that maximizes the manufacturer's profit against every admissible competing equilibrium.
In the partial-repair regime, , , and .
Formalization Note The full-repair price is one point on the source's optimal line. The nonnegative unit-cost pins, zero-price excess-supply corner, and none encoding of are part of the shared model.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RightRepair_Equilibrium_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RightRepair.Equilibrium
theorem case_2_1 (P : Params) (hP : Standing P)
(hI : (P.δ + P.cM) / 2 ≤ P.cI ∧ P.cI < P.δ) :
(P.c ≤ cLow P →
OptimalOutcome P (pnNo P) none (puNo P) 0) ∧
(cLow P < P.c → P.c < cBar P →
OptimalOutcome P (pnNo P) (some ((P.δ + P.cM) / 2))
((P.δ + P.cM) / 2)
(alphaHat P (pnNo P) ((P.δ + P.cM) / 2)) ∧
0 < alphaHat P (pnNo P) ((P.δ + P.cM) / 2) ∧
alphaHat P (pnNo P) ((P.δ + P.cM) / 2) < 1) ∧
(cBar P ≤ P.c →
OptimalOutcome P (pnFull P) (some 0) (puFull P) 1) := by sorry
end RightRepair.Equilibrium
Source
Jin, Yang & Zhu, Right to Repair: Pricing, Welfare, and Environmental Implications, authors' manuscript of Management Science (2022), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4401 (PDF sha256 b869b33a…1763), OA pp. 26–31, Case 2.1 and three conclusions (PDF 59–64)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.