Proof of Theorem 2 — every f-set game has a correlated equilibrium
ProvedHartSchmeidler.FinStrat.fset_game_has_ceLet be a nonempty set of players, each with a nonempty finite strategy set , and let each real payoff be bounded on the full profile space . For every f-set , the restricted game has a finite weighted correlated equilibrium: there are finitely many profiles and nonnegative weights summing to one such that
This supplies the approximating equilibria in the proof of Theorem 2. No continuity is required for this finite-game step.
Formalization Note. An f-set has nonempty and only finitely many nonsingleton coordinates. The boundedness hypothesis records §3's standing game convention; finite restrictions themselves require no continuity. Profiles in are supported on , and zero-weight profiles may be included in without changing the represented distribution.
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_FinStrat_Game
namespace HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
open MeasureTheory
/-- Proof of Theorem 2, pp. 22–23: every f-set game Γ_T has a finite-support
correlated equilibrium, whether or not the payoff functions are continuous. -/
theorem fset_game_has_ce {ι : Type*} [Nonempty ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
(h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
(hbounded : ∀ i, ∃ C : ℝ, ∀ s, |h i s| ≤ C)
(T : ∀ i, Finset (S i))
(hT : IsFSet T) :
∃ (F : Finset (∀ i, S i)) (w : (∀ i, S i) → ℝ), IsFSetCE h T F w := by sorry
end HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.