for every feasible LP solution
ProvedComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding.expected_alg_ge_lp_valueapproximation-algorithmscombinatorial-auctionsp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1randomized-roundingxos-valuations
Let , let every bidder have an XOS valuation with admissible clause set and XOS oracle , and let be a highest-clause assignment rule. Let be a feasible solution of the LP relaxation with value . Run the algorithm of §3.2 on the preallocation drawn by randomized rounding from , and let be the welfare of its allocation. Then
This is the bound the proof of Theorem 3.2 establishes against the fractional value, from which the guarantee against the integral optimum follows.
Formalization Note The statement holds for every feasible , every choice of maximizing clauses and every tie-breaking in step (iii).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_XOSRounding_Model import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_XOSRounding_Rounding import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_XOSRounding_Algorithm
Formal statement
namespace ComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding
theorem expected_alg_ge_lp_value {n m : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n)
(W : Fin n → Finset (Fin m → ℝ)) (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
(hv : ∀ i, IsXOSWith (v i) (W i))
(cl : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → Fin m → ℝ) (hcl : ∀ i, IsXOSOracle (v i) (W i) (cl i))
(win : (Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) → Fin m → Fin n) (hwin : IsHighestClauseRule cl win)
(x : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (hx : IsLPFeasible x) :
(1 - (1 - 1 / (n : ℝ)) ^ n) * lpValue v x ≤
roundingExpectation x (algWelfare v win) := by sorry
end ComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding
Source
Dobzinski, Nisan, Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010, p. 7, §3.2, proof of Theorem 3.2, display preceding Lemma 3.3
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.