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Keywise correctness (KC) of the label scheme and its failure probability δL\delta_LδL​

Definition
RestrictedDec_Supplement_kcFail

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

For a label scheme LLL with label space {0,1}ℓ(λ)\{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}{0,1}ℓ(λ), the keywise-correctness failure probability is

δL(λ)=Pr⁡(pk,sk)←KeyGenL(1λ)[¬ ∀y∈{0,1}ℓ(λ) ∀r∈CoinsL: Decsk(Encpk(y;r))=y],\delta_L(\lambda)=\Pr_{(pk,sk)\leftarrow\mathrm{KeyGen}_L(1^\lambda)}\Big[\neg\ \forall y\in\{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\ \forall r\in\mathrm{Coins}_L:\ \mathrm{Dec}_{sk}(\mathrm{Enc}_{pk}(y;r))=y\Big],δL​(λ)=(pk,sk)←KeyGenL​(1λ)Pr​[¬ ∀y∈{0,1}ℓ(λ) ∀r∈CoinsL​: Decsk​(Encpk​(y;r))=y],

and LLL is keywise correct (KC) if δL\delta_LδL​ is negligible (Definition 4). The bound covers every label and every allowed randomness, including encryption coins chosen by the adversary; δL\delta_LδL​ is the term 12δL12\delta_L12δL​ of (B.5) and 2δL2\delta_L2δL​ of Theorem 11.

Formalization Note CoinsL\mathrm{Coins}_LCoinsL​ is the set of all encryption coin vectors of LLL: honest label encryption draws uniformly from all of them.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NoisyOWMPC_Negligible
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_PKE
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false

namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

open Classical in
/-- The **keywise-correctness failure probability** `δ_L(λ)` of a label scheme `L` with label
space `{0,1}^{ℓ(λ)}`: the probability over `(pk, sk) ← KeyGen_L(1^λ)` that some label
`y ∈ {0,1}^{ℓ(λ)}` and some allowed coins `r ∈ Coins_L` give `Dec_sk(Enc_pk(y; r)) ≠ y`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Definition 4, p.29; (KC), p.35
("except with negligible probability δL(λ) over the label key pair, ∀y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(λ) ∀r ∈ CoinsL :
Decsk(Encpk(y; r)) = y").

**Formalization Note.** `Coins_L` is the set of all encryption coin vectors of `L`
(`Fin (encCoins λ) → Bool`): honest label encryption draws uniformly from all of them, and the
relations (B.1), (B.4) check that a claimed coin string has exactly this length. -/
noncomputable def kcFail (L : PKE) (ℓ : ℕ → ℕ) (lam : ℕ) : ℝ :=
  (((L.keyLaw lam).map fun k => decide (¬ ∀ y : Str, y.length = ℓ lam →
    ∀ ρ : Fin (L.encCoins lam) → Bool, L.dec lam k.2 (L.enc lam k.1 y ρ) = some y)) true).toReal

/-- **Keywise correctness** (KC) of the label scheme `L` (Definition 4): `δ_L` is negligible. -/
def KeywiseCorrect (L : PKE) (ℓ : ℕ → ℕ) : Prop := NoisyOWMPC.Negligible (kcFail L ℓ)

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Definition 4, p.29; (KC), p.35

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