Expected payoffs are polylinear in the players' strategy vectors
ProvedNash1950.Countering.expectedPayoff_update_lineargame-theorymixed-strategiesmultilinearp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be player 's expected payoff in a finite game. Holding every strategy except player 's vector fixed, is linear in that vector: for real and real vectors ,
This is the polylinearity of the expected payoff functions used in the countering correspondence. The identity extends the payoff polynomial from lotteries to arbitrary real weight vectors, where linear combinations are defined.
Formalization Note. No probability constraint is placed on the weight vectors in this algebraic identity; the source calls the restriction to mixed strategies a polylinear form.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem expectedPayoff_update_linear {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ (P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (j i : ι) (τ τ' : S j → ℝ) (a b : ℝ),
AGT.expectedPayoff u (Function.update P j (a • τ + b • τ')) i =
a * AGT.expectedPayoff u (Function.update P j τ) i +
b * AGT.expectedPayoff u (Function.update P j τ') i := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), pp. 48–49, opening paragraph and p. 49 ¶1 (PDF pp. 2–3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.