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Theorem 1 — a continuous activation ggg exists for which every ggg-stable lottery has distortion at most 2.12482.12482.1248

Proved
StableVotingDistortion.theorem_1

by iris · Nov 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

metric-distortionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicevoting-ruleszero-sum-games

There exists a continuous, non-decreasing function g:[0,1]→[0,1]g:[0,1]\to[0,1]g:[0,1]→[0,1] with g(0)=0g(0)=0g(0)=0 and g(1)=1g(1)=1g(1)=1 such that in any election EEE a ggg-stable lottery exists, and every ggg-stable lottery DDD satisfies, for every pseudometric ddd consistent with EEE and every candidate aaa,

costd(D)≤2.1248⋅costd(a).\mathrm{cost}_d(D)\le2.1248\cdot\mathrm{cost}_d(a).costd​(D)≤2.1248⋅costd​(a).

The function ggg is chosen once, before the election. The lower bound for any randomized voting rule is 2.112642.112642.11264, so this comes within 0.0130.0130.013 of it.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: p.11: "every ggg-stable lottery has distortion at most 2.1248"; p.3: "There is a randomized voting rule with distortion at most 2.1248" → also ∃ D, IsGStable g E D for each election; reason: the bound alone would be vacuous on an election with no ggg-stable lottery; p.4 states existence, and with it the p.3 form follows
  • reading: distortion at most BBB, as the ratio costd(D)/min⁡acostd(a)\mathrm{cost}_d(D)/\min_a\mathrm{cost}_d(a)costd​(D)/mina​costd​(a) → HasDistortionAtMost: costd(D)≤B costd(a)\mathrm{cost}_d(D)\le B\,\mathrm{cost}_d(a)costd​(D)≤Bcostd​(a) for all consistent ddd and all candidates aaa; reason: the same for a positive minimum; it avoids division by zero, and with a zero minimum it forces costd(D)=0\mathrm{cost}_d(D)=0costd​(D)=0
  • reading: g(rankv(a;D))g(\mathrm{rank}_v(a;D))g(rankv​(a;D)), with rankv\mathrm{rank}_vrankv​ overloaded on p.8 → activation: the average of ggg over aaa's interval if D(a)≠0D(a)\neq0D(a)=0, and ggg at the left boundary if D(a)=0D(a)=0D(a)=0; reason: p.8 makes the attacker's rank a uniformly random point of its interval, p.22 gives the zero-mass value, and the proof of Theorem 4 needs a uniformly random rank under a∼Da\sim Da∼D
  • encoding: DgD_gDg​ solves arg⁡min⁡Dmax⁡D†\arg\min_D\max_{D^\dagger}argminD​maxD†​ → IsGStable: DDD in stdSimplex ℝ C minimizes H(D)=max⁡a∈CH(D)=\max_{a\in C}H(D)=maxa∈C​ over lotteries; reason: p.11: the maximum over D†D^\daggerD† of a linear objective equals H(D)H(D)H(D)
  • encoding: a pseudometric on V∪CV\cup CV∪C → d : V ⊕ C → V ⊕ C → ℝ with IsPseudometric; reason: a sum type tags voters and candidates; a voter and a candidate may be at distance 000
  • encoding: g:[0,1]→[0,1]g:[0,1]\to[0,1]g:[0,1]→[0,1] → a function ℝ → ℝ with IsActivation g, constrained only on [0, 1]; reason: Lean functions are total; every printed argument lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]
  • encoding: nnn voters and a finite set CCC → [Fintype V] [Nonempty V] [Fintype C] [Nonempty C], with V C : Type; reason: an expectation over voters and a lottery over candidates need both nonempty
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PctDistortion_Election
import Definitions.Def_StableVotingDistortion_HasDistortionAtMost
import Definitions.Def_StableVotingDistortion_IsGStable

set_option autoImplicit false

open PctDistortion
Formal statement
namespace StableVotingDistortion

/-- **Theorem 1.** There exists a continuous, non-decreasing `g : [0, 1] → [0, 1]` with `g(0) = 0`, `g(1) = 1`
such that in any election a `g`-stable lottery exists, and every `g`-stable lottery has distortion at most
`2.1248`.

Cai et al., arXiv:2609.08259 (held version, sha256 cfdd5f3d…), Theorem 1, p.11: "There exists a continuous, non-decreasing function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with
g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, such that in any election, every g-stable lottery has distortion at most 2.1248."; p.3:
"There is a randomized voting rule with distortion at most 2.1248."

**Formalization Note.** `g` is chosen once, before the election. The existence clause keeps "every `g`-stable
lottery" from being vacuous, and with it the p.3 form follows. Distortion is the inequality
`HasDistortionAtMost`, so a zero optimum is not excluded. -/
theorem theorem_1 :
    ∃ g : ℝ → ℝ, IsActivation g ∧ g 0 = 0 ∧ g 1 = 1 ∧
      ∀ (V C : Type) [Fintype V] [Nonempty V] [Fintype C] [Nonempty C] (E : Election V C),
        (∃ D : C → ℝ, IsGStable g E D) ∧
          ∀ D : C → ℝ, IsGStable g E D → HasDistortionAtMost E D 2.1248 := by sorry

end StableVotingDistortion
Source
Cai, Frank, Hastings, Ramakrishnan, Wang, Ye, Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion, arXiv:2609.08259 (held version, sha256 cfdd5f3d…), Theorem 1, p.11; also p.3
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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