Each countering set is convex
ProvedNash1950.Countering.counteringSet_convexbest-responseconvexitygame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
For any profile of player strategy vectors, the set of countering mixed profiles is convex:
Convexity is one of the conditions Nash identifies before applying Kakutani's theorem.
Formalization Note. The claim holds even when is an arbitrary real weight profile; the source only applies it to a mixed profile.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem counteringSet_convex {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, Convex ℝ (counteringSet u P) := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶3, sentence 2 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.