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Theorem 5.3, p. 554 — balanced prices are closed under maxima of valuations

Proved
BalancedPrices.ClosureMax.theorem_5_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

balanced-pricescompositionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1prophet-inequalityvaluation-maxima

Fix agents with outcome spaces XiX_iXi​ (null outcome ∅\varnothing∅), a downward-closed feasible set F\mathcal FF, an exchange-compatible family (Fx)x∈X(\mathcal F_x)_{x\in X}(Fx​)x∈X​, base valuation spaces ViV_iVi​ whose functions take values in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and constants α>0\alpha>0α>0, β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0. Let ALG be a consistent allocation rule feasible for every profile in Vmax⁡V^{\max}Vmax, and suppose that for every w∈Vw\in Vw∈V the pricing rule pwp^wpw is (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced with respect to www, ALG and (Fx)(\mathcal F_x)(Fx​). Let v∈Vmax⁡v\in V^{\max}v∈Vmax and let v~∈V\tilde v\in Vv~∈V be a supporting valuation profile for ALG⁡(v)\operatorname{ALG}(v)ALG(v). Then the pricing rule pv~p^{\tilde v}pv~ is (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced with respect to vvv, ALG and (Fx)(\mathcal F_x)(Fx​): for every x∈Fx\in\mathcal Fx∈F and every x′∈Fxx'\in\mathcal F_xx′∈Fx​,

∑ipiv~(xi∣x[i−1])≥1α(v(ALG⁡(v))−v(OPT⁡(v,Fx))),∑ipiv~(xi′∣x[i−1])≤β⋅v(OPT⁡(v,Fx)).\sum_{i}p_i^{\tilde v}(x_i\mid x_{[i-1]})\ge\frac1\alpha\bigl(v(\operatorname{ALG}(v))-v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))\bigr),\qquad \sum_{i}p_i^{\tilde v}(x'_i\mid x_{[i-1]})\le\beta\cdot v(\operatorname{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x)).i∑​piv~​(xi​∣x[i−1]​)≥α1​(v(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx​))),i∑​piv~​(xi′​∣x[i−1]​)≤β⋅v(OPT(v,Fx​)).

The pricing-rule condition is retained, and the constants α\alphaα and β\betaβ and the family (Fx)(\mathcal F_x)(Fx​) are unchanged. With Theorem 5.4 this is how balanced prices for single-item markets yield balanced prices for XOS valuations, which are maxima of additive ones.

Formalization Note The statement quantifies over every v∈Vmax⁡v\in V^{\max}v∈Vmax and every supporting v~∈V\tilde v\in Vv~∈V (not only v~=v\tilde v=vv~=v). Agents are indexed from zero; "for each v∈Vv\in Vv∈V there exists a pricing rule pvp^vpv" is encoded as a function pr from profiles to pricing rules. The optimum is a real supremum, bounded by the [0,1][0,1][0,1] bound of §2, which Vmax⁡V^{\max}Vmax inherits. Prices are ℝ≥0∞ with ENNReal.ofReal on the real bounds. Definition 3.1 prints α>0\alpha>0α>0, β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, and these are the hypotheses.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BalancedPrices_ClosureMax_Composition
Formal statement
namespace BalancedPrices.ClosureMax

/-- Theorem 5.3: balanced prices pass to finite pointwise maxima. -/
theorem theorem_5_3 {n : ℕ} {X : Fin n → Type*}
    (nul : BalancedPrices.Extension.Outcome X) (F : Set (BalancedPrices.Extension.Outcome X))
    (hdown : BalancedPrices.Extension.DownClosed nul F)
    (Fam : BalancedPrices.Extension.Outcome X → Set (BalancedPrices.Extension.Outcome X))
    (Vsp : ∀ i, Set (X i → ℝ))
    (hV : ∀ i (f : X i → ℝ), f ∈ Vsp i → ∀ xi, 0 ≤ f xi ∧ f xi ≤ 1)
    (α β : ℝ) (hα : 0 < α) (hβ : 0 ≤ β)
    (hFam : BalancedPrices.Extension.ExchFamily F Fam)
    (ALG : BalancedPrices.Extension.Valuation X → BalancedPrices.Extension.Outcome X)
    (hALG : ∀ w, (∀ i, w i ∈ VmaxSet Vsp i) → ALG w ∈ F)
    (hcons : Consistent Vsp ALG)
    (pr : BalancedPrices.Extension.Valuation X → BalancedPrices.Extension.PriceRule X)
    (hprice : ∀ w, (∀ i, w i ∈ Vsp i) → BalancedPrices.Extension.IsPricingRule F (pr w))
    (hbal : ∀ w : BalancedPrices.Extension.Valuation X, (∀ i, w i ∈ Vsp i) →
      BalancedPrices.Extension.Balanced nul α β F Fam w (ALG w) (pr w))
    (vf vt : BalancedPrices.Extension.Valuation X) (hvf : ∀ i, vf i ∈ VmaxSet Vsp i)
    (hsup : IsSupporting Vsp vt (ALG vf) vf) :
    BalancedPrices.Extension.IsPricingRule F (pr vt) ∧
      BalancedPrices.Extension.Balanced nul α β F Fam vf (ALG vf) (pr vt) := by sorry

end BalancedPrices.ClosureMax
Source
Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim, Lucier, Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs, SIAM J. Comput. 49 (2020), p. 554, Theorem 5.3; proof p. 560
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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