Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Eq. (1), p. 13 — the optimal personalized price r*_M(v, p₂) in the three cases, for v ≥ p₂

Proved
GDPRDataMarkets.Rights.eq1_personalized_price

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

gdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationprivacy

Consider an opted-in consumer with valuation v∈[0,1]v\in[0,1]v∈[0,1], a basic price p2≤vp_2\le vp2​≤v, and the firm's expected second-period revenue R(v,p2,r)R(v,p_2,r)R(v,p2​,r) from this consumer at personalized price rrr, where κ∈{κL,κH}\kappa\in\{\kappa_L,\kappa_H\}κ∈{κL​,κH​} is equally likely and unknown to the firm. Then:

  1. if 2(κLv−c)≥κHv−c≥02(\kappa_Lv-c)\ge\kappa_Hv-c\ge 02(κL​v−c)≥κH​v−c≥0, the price r=κLv+p2−cr=\kappa_Lv+p_2-cr=κL​v+p2​−c maximizes R(v,p2,⋅)R(v,p_2,\cdot)R(v,p2​,⋅);
  2. if κHv−c≥max⁡{2(κLv−c),0}\kappa_Hv-c\ge\max\{2(\kappa_Lv-c),0\}κH​v−c≥max{2(κL​v−c),0}, the price r=κHv+p2−cr=\kappa_Hv+p_2-cr=κH​v+p2​−c maximizes it;
  3. if 0≥max⁡{κHv−c, 2(κLv−c)}0\ge\max\{\kappa_Hv-c,\ 2(\kappa_Lv-c)\}0≥max{κH​v−c, 2(κL​v−c)}, every price r>κHv+p2−cr>\kappa_Hv+p_2-cr>κH​v+p2​−c maximizes it.

In summary,

rM∗(v,p2) {=κLv+p2−cin case (i),=κHv+p2−cin case (ii),>κHv+p2−cin case (iii).r^*_M(v,p_2)\ \begin{cases}=\kappa_Lv+p_2-c & \text{in case (i)},\\ =\kappa_Hv+p_2-c & \text{in case (ii)},\\ >\kappa_Hv+p_2-c & \text{in case (iii)}.\end{cases}rM∗​(v,p2​) ⎩⎨⎧​=κL​v+p2​−c=κH​v+p2​−c>κH​v+p2​−c​in case (i),in case (ii),in case (iii).​

In case (i) both types buy the personalized good, in case (ii) only the high type, and in case (iii) both types erase their data and buy the basic good. This is the firm's second-period pricing problem; the equilibrium uses case (i).

Formalization Note The standing assumptions κH>κL>0\kappa_H>\kappa_L>0κH​>κL​>0, δ∈(0,1]\delta\in(0,1]δ∈(0,1], c≥0c\ge0c≥0 are hypotheses. An opted-in consumer keeps her data on a tie and, after erasing, buys the basic good iff v≥p2v\ge p_2v≥p2​; with the page's strict rule v−p2>…v-p_2>\dotsv−p2​>…, cases (ii) and (iii) would fail at v=p2v=p_2v=p2​.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Rights_Model
Formal statement
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Rights

/-- Eq. (1), p. 13: for `v ≥ p₂`, the optimal personalized price is `κ_L v + p₂ − c` in case (i),
`κ_H v + p₂ − c` in case (ii), and any price above `κ_H v + p₂ − c` in case (iii). -/
theorem eq1_personalized_price (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) (v q : ℝ)
    (hv : v ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hq : q ≤ v) :
    (P.kH * v - P.c ≤ 2 * (P.kL * v - P.c) ∧ 0 ≤ P.kH * v - P.c →
        ∀ ρ : ℝ, R P v q ρ ≤ R P v q (P.kL * v + q - P.c)) ∧
    (max (2 * (P.kL * v - P.c)) 0 ≤ P.kH * v - P.c →
        ∀ ρ : ℝ, R P v q ρ ≤ R P v q (P.kH * v + q - P.c)) ∧
    (max (P.kH * v - P.c) (2 * (P.kL * v - P.c)) ≤ 0 →
        ∀ ρ : ℝ, P.kH * v + q - P.c < ρ → ∀ ρ' : ℝ, R P v q ρ' ≤ R P v q ρ) := by sorry

end GDPRDataMarkets.Rights
Source
Ke, Sudhir, Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets, SSRN 3643979 (pdfTeX build 2022-09-14), p. 13, eq. (1)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me