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Theorem 1 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite) — a strict voting procedure with ≥ 3 outcomes is strategy-proof iff dictatorial

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

gibbard-satterthwaitep2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofnessvoting

Consider a strict committee: n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 individuals, a finite set SmS_mSm​ of alternatives, and ballots restricted to strong orders (no indifference between distinct alternatives). Let ν:ρmn→Sm\nu:\rho_m^n\to S_mν:ρmn​→Sm​ be a strict voting procedure whose range Tp=ν(ρmn)T_p=\nu(\rho_m^n)Tp​=ν(ρmn​) contains p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 alternatives (so m≥p≥3m\ge p\ge 3m≥p≥3). Then

ν is strategy-proof  ⟺  ν is dictatorial,\nu \text{ is strategy-proof} \iff \nu \text{ is dictatorial},ν is strategy-proof⟺ν is dictatorial,

where dictatorial means that some individual iii obtains, at every strict ballot set CCC, the CiC_iCi​-best element of TpT_pTp​.

This is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem in the form that allows a range smaller than the alternative set: a strategy-proof procedure that never selects some alternatives is still dictatorial on its range ("partially dictatorial"). In the extension to ballots with indifference (Theorem 1′) it is applied to the strict procedure produced by Lemma 9.

Formalization Note Strict ballot sets are StrongProfile ι A (functions into the subtype of strong orders), the procedure is a total function on them, and TpT_pTp​ is Set.range ν, so p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 is 3 ≤ (Set.range ν).ncard; m≥pm\ge pm≥p is automatic for a finite type A. The individuals form a finite type ι with 1≤∣ι∣1\le |\iota|1≤∣ι∣. Dictatorial is StrictDictatorial: ν(C) Ci y\nu(C)\,C_i\,yν(C)Ci​y for all y∈Tpy\in T_py∈Tp​, which for strong orders says ν(C)\nu(C)ν(C) is iii's top element of TpT_pTp​. This restates the goal of the companion mission on strict committees in this mission's encoding.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakGS_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS

/-- **Theorem 1 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite)** (Satterthwaite, p. 11). For a strict committee with
`n ≥ 1` individuals and `m ≥ p ≥ 3`, where `p` is the number of alternatives in the range of the
strict voting procedure `ν`, `ν` is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial. -/
theorem theorem_1 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
    (hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (ν : StrictVotingProcedure ι A)
    (hp : 3 ≤ (Set.range ν).ncard) :
    StrictStrategyProof ν ↔ StrictDictatorial ν := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Theorem 1, p. 11
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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