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The unsigned CHK compiler (4.4)

Definition
RestrictedDec_Supplement_unsignedCHK

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

For an observation qqq with Validq,Repq\mathrm{Valid}_q,\mathrm{Rep}_qValidq​,Repq​, a residual scheme RRR, an IBE III with identity space I\mathcal II and a PRF PPP:

  1. KeyGen\mathrm{KeyGen}KeyGen: (pkR,skR)←KeyGenR(pk_R,sk_R)\leftarrow\mathrm{KeyGen}_R(pkR​,skR​)←KeyGenR​, (mpk,msk)←SetupI(mpk,msk)\leftarrow\mathrm{Setup}_I(mpk,msk)←SetupI​, a seed kkk; pk=(pkR,mpk)pk=(pk_R,mpk)pk=(pkR​,mpk), sk=(skR,msk,k)sk=(sk_R,msk,k)sk=(skR​,msk,k).
  2. Encpk(m)\mathrm{Enc}_{pk}(m)Encpk​(m): a fresh uniform identity id←{0,1}λid\leftarrow\{0,1\}^\lambdaid←{0,1}λ, d←EncR(pkR,m)d\leftarrow\mathrm{Enc}_R(pk_R,m)d←EncR​(pkR​,m), a←IEnc(mpk,id,q(m))a\leftarrow\mathrm{IEnc}(mpk,id,q(m))a←IEnc(mpk,id,q(m)); C=(d,id,a)C=(d,id,a)C=(d,id,a).
  3. Decsk(C)\mathrm{Dec}_{sk}(C)Decsk​(C): reject malformed CCC; derive skid=ExtractI(msk,id;PRFk(id))sk_{id}=\mathrm{Extract}_I(msk,id;\mathrm{PRF}_k(id))skid​=ExtractI​(msk,id;PRFk​(id)), y=IDec(skid,a)y=\mathrm{IDec}(sk_{id},a)y=IDec(skid​,a); if y=⊥y=\boty=⊥ or Validq(1λ,y)=0\mathrm{Valid}_q(1^\lambda,y)=0Validq​(1λ,y)=0 output ⊥\bot⊥; else output Normq(y,DecR(skR,d))\mathrm{Norm}_q(y,\mathrm{Dec}_R(sk_R,d))Normq​(y,DecR​(skR​,d)).

Decryption never rejects because the residual plaintext disagrees with the label; it normalizes instead.

Formalization Note Tuples are canonical tuple codes; a string that is not the code of a triple, or whose identity is outside Iλ\mathcal I_\lambdaIλ​, is malformed and decrypts to ⊥\bot⊥. The PRF output is read as the extraction tape.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BeyondDS_tup
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_PKE
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_interact
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_Obs
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_IBE
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_PRF
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false

namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

open Classical in
/-- The **unsigned CHK-based compiler** (4.4) for the observation `q` with `Valid_q`, `Rep_q`,
built from a residual scheme `R`, an IBE `I` and a PRF `P` (fixed per-identity extraction coins):
1. `KeyGen(1^λ)`: `(pk_R, sk_R) ← KeyGen_R`, `(mpk, msk) ← Setup_I`, seed `k ← PGen`;
   `pk = (pk_R, mpk)`, `sk = (sk_R, msk, k)`;
2. `Enc_pk(m)`: a fresh uniform identity `id ← {0,1}^λ`, `d ← Enc_R(pk_R, m)`,
   `a ← IEnc(mpk, id, q(m))`, `C = (d, id, a)`;
3. `Dec_sk(C)`: reject (`⊥`) a malformed `C`, including one whose identity is outside the IBE
   identity space `Id_λ`; otherwise `sk_id = Extract_I(msk, id; PRF_k(id))`,
   `y = IDec(sk_id, a)`; if `y = ⊥` or `Valid_q(1^λ, y) = 0` output `⊥`; else output
   `Norm_q(y, Dec_R(sk_R, d))`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), §4.2, pp.24–25 ("Replace the
verification key by a fresh uniform identity id ← {0, 1}λ, and encrypt d ← EncpkR(m),
a ← IEnc(mpk, id, q(m)), C = (d, id, a). (4.4) Decryption obtains the fixed private key for id,
decrypts a, checks label validity, and applies the same normalization."); the signed decryption
rule, p.25; Lemma 2, p.31.

**Formalization Note.** An identity outside the IBE's public identity space `Id_λ` is treated as a
malformed component and rejected. Tuples are `BeyondDS.tup` codes and "malformed" means "not the code of a
triple" (`parseTup`). The PRF output is read as the extraction coin vector (`coinsOf`; the PRF
hypotheses fix its length to `r_ext(λ)`). Coins of key generation and encryption are split in the
order listed. -/
noncomputable def unsignedCHK (M Id : ℕ → Str → Prop) (o : Obs) (R : PKE) (I : IBE) (P : PRF) :
    PKE where
  keyCoins := fun lam => R.keyCoins lam + I.setupCoins lam + P.keyCoins lam
  encCoins := fun lam => lam + R.encCoins lam + I.encCoins lam
  keyGen := fun lam r =>
    (BeyondDS.tup [(R.keyGen lam (cL (cL r))).1, (I.setup lam (cR (cL r))).1],
      BeyondDS.tup [(R.keyGen lam (cL (cL r))).2, (I.setup lam (cR (cL r))).2, P.gen lam (cR r)])
  enc := fun lam pk m ρ =>
    BeyondDS.tup [R.enc lam (fld pk 0) m (cR (cL ρ)), List.ofFn (cL (cL ρ)),
      I.enc lam (fld pk 1) (List.ofFn (cL (cL ρ))) (o.q lam (some m)) (cR ρ)]
  dec := fun lam sk C =>
    match parseTup 3 C with
    | some [d, i, a] =>
      if Id lam i then
      match I.dec lam (I.extract lam (fld sk 1) i
          (coinsOf (I.extCoins lam) (P.eval lam (fld sk 2) i))) a with
      | some y => if o.valid lam y then norm M o lam y (R.dec lam (fld sk 0) d) else none
      | none => none
      else none
    | _ => none

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), §4.2, (4.4), p.25; (4.1), p.23; Lemma 2, p.31

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