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Theorem 6.6 — the α\sqrt\alphaα​ bound is tight: OPT≥(⌊min⁡{n,α−1/2}⌋/10)⋅SelRev\mathrm{OPT}\ge(\lfloor\min\{n,\alpha^{-1/2}\}\rfloor/10)\cdot\mathrm{SelRev}OPT≥(⌊min{n,α−1/2}⌋/10)⋅SelRev

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LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement.theorem_6_6

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and 0<α≤10<\alpha\le10<α≤1 there are nnn independent, bounded, α-strongly regular value laws D1,…,DnD_1,\dots,D_nD1​,…,Dn​ with 0<OPT<∞0<\mathrm{OPT}<\infty0<OPT<∞ such that, writing m=⌊min⁡{n,α−1/2}⌋m=\lfloor\min\{n,\alpha^{-1/2}\}\rfloorm=⌊min{n,α−1/2}⌋,

OPT ≥ m10 SelRev\mathrm{OPT}\ \ge\ \frac m{10}\,\mathrm{SelRev}OPT ≥ 10m​SelRev

for the seller's revenue SelRev\mathrm{SelRev}SelRev under every seller menu O\mathcal OO (an arbitrary randomized truthful auction: possibly infinite, with a utility-maximizing option for every type), every utility-maximizing option choice σ\sigmaσ of the forwarded bidder, and every best response of the revenue-maximizing intermediary in the message-independent model. Moreover, for these laws every menu has an intermediary best response.

The paper writes OPT/RandMI=Ω(min⁡{n,α−1/2})\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{RandMI}=\Omega(\min\{n,\alpha^{-1/2}\})OPT/RandMI=Ω(min{n,α−1/2}); the proof gives the factor m/10m/10m/10 (for m≥10m\ge10m≥10, RandMI≤5/m\mathrm{RandMI}\le5/mRandMI≤5/m and OPT≥1/2\mathrm{OPT}\ge1/2OPT≥1/2; for m<10m<10m<10, RandMI≤OPT\mathrm{RandMI}\le\mathrm{OPT}RandMI≤OPT). With Theorem 6.5 this shows that α\sqrt\alphaα​ is the right dependence for many bidders.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: OPT/RandMI = Omega(min{n, alpha^{-1/2}}) with RandMI the seller's maximum revenue over menus → OPT >= (floor(min{n, alpha^{-1/2}})/10) * SelRev for every menu, every utility-maximizing selection and every intermediary best response; reason: the proof's constant m/10; the bound for all menus, tie-breaks and best responses implies the bound on the source's RandMI (the proof's seller-favourable tie-break only increases revenue); since m >= min/2 this gives the Omega
  • generalization: the intermediary is presumed to best respond → the conclusion also asserts that every menu has a best response; reason: a stronger conclusion; it rules out an upper bound that holds only because no best response exists
  • encoding: the ratio OPT/RandMI → the product form OPT >= c * SelRev; reason: OPT is positive and finite; the product form is defined when SelRev = 0
  • encoding: an arbitrary randomized truthful seller auction → GenMenu, a possibly infinite menu containing (0,0) with a utility maximizer for every type; reason: a truthful auction for one bidder is its menu of (allocation, payment) options (Lemma A.12), maximizers being its truthful choices
  • reading: bounded → (D i).hi finite for every i; reason: each support [a, b] has b < infinity
  • encoding: independent nonnegative bidder values and expected revenues → Fin n, product probability measures, EReal optima, and measurable mechanisms with integrable payments and all report sections; reason: these represent the same stochastic auction; unbounded optima and undefined real integrals cannot default to zero
  • encoding: Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality → truthful inequalities for almost every original value against every real report; reason: null types do not affect revenue; reports outside the support extend the mechanism without changing its attainable revenues
  • encoding: alpha-strongly regular: phi(y) - phi(x) >= alpha (y - x) for all a <= x <= y <= b (Definition A.2) → StronglyRegular alpha D on the published ValueDist, asked for lo < x <= y <= hi; reason: the same set as the published Regular; the lowest point a is a null type whose density may vanish, and alpha = 0 gives exactly Regular
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_StrongRegularity
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_GeneralMenu

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- Theorem 6.6: for every `n ≥ 1` and `0 < α ≤ 1` some `n` independent bounded
α-strongly regular laws have `OPT ≥ (⌊min{n, α^{-1/2}}⌋ / 10) · SelRev` for the
seller's revenue under every (possibly infinite) menu, every utility-maximizing
option choice and every intermediary best response; every menu has a best response. -/
theorem theorem_6_6 (n : ℕ) (hn : 0 < n) (α : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα1 : α ≤ 1) :
    ∃ D : Fin n → ValueDist,
      (∀ i, (D i).hi ≠ ⊤) ∧ (∀ i, StronglyRegular α (D i)) ∧
      0 < OPT D ∧ OPT D < ⊤ ∧
      (∀ O : GenMenu, ∃ I : Mechanism n, GenBestResponse D O I) ∧
      ∀ (O : GenMenu) (σ : ℝ → ℝ × ℝ), IsUtilityMaximizing O σ →
        ∀ I : Mechanism n, GenBestResponse D O I →
          (((⌊min (n : ℝ) (α ^ (-(1 / 2 : ℝ)))⌋₊ : ℝ) / 10 * genSellerRevenue D σ I : ℝ) : EReal)
            ≤ OPT D := by sorry

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), Theorem 6.6, p.26 (PDF p.27); proof pp.26–29 (PDF pp.27–30); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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