Theorem 1.3 — every instance with XOS valuations admits a -MMS allocation
OpenSubadditiveMMS580.Amplification.Supplement.theorem_1_3fair-divisionmaximin-sharep2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1xos
Let agents have XOS valuations on a finite set of goods: each is the maximum of finitely many (at least one) additive valuations with nonnegative coefficients, . Then there are pairwise disjoint bundles with
where is the maximum, over ordered partitions of into possibly empty bundles, of the minimum bundle value.
This companion theorem improves the universal MMS guarantee for XOS valuations from to ; it is not used in the proof of the mission's goal (Theorem 1.1).
Differences from the source:
- encoding: XOS: the maximum of finitely many additive valuations → DSICHardRev.IsXOS: a nonempty finite family of nonnegative weight vectors with v(S) = max_ℓ w_ℓ(S); reason: additive valuations have nonnegative coefficients (§2.2, p. 9), and a maximum of finitely many requires at least one
- encoding: every instance → n : ℕ agents with 1 ≤ n, any m; reason: an instance has at least one agent
- encoding: an allocation (pairwise disjoint bundles, goods may stay unassigned) → IsAllocation A (pairwise disjoint Finset bundles indexed by Fin n); reason: the source allows partial allocations (§2.1, p. 8); completing one cannot lower a monotone value
- encoding: , the maximum over ordered partitions of into possibly empty bundles of the minimum bundle value → LittleCharity.MMS.mms (v i) n univ, a supremum over labelings Fin m → Fin n of the minimum labelled bundle value; reason: a labeling is exactly an ordered partition into n possibly empty bundles; the index set is finite and nonempty for n ≥ 1, so the supremum is the maximum
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DSICHardRev_ValuationClasses import Definitions.Def_MultiAllocToAlloc_Subadditive_Allocation import Definitions.Def_LittleCharity_MMS_Setting open MultiAllocToAlloc.Subadditive
Formal statement
namespace SubadditiveMMS580.Amplification.Supplement
/-- Theorem 1.3 (XOS valuations; Li–Sun, STOC 2027 submission #580, p. 4): every instance with
`n ≥ 1` agents and XOS valuations on the goods `Fin m` (each `v_i` the maximum of finitely many,
at least one, nonnegative additive valuations) admits a `5/16`-MMS allocation: pairwise disjoint
bundles `A_i` with `v_i(A_i) ≥ (5/16) · MMS_n(v_i; M)`. -/
theorem theorem_1_3 (n : ℕ) (hn : 1 ≤ n) {m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
(hv : ∀ i, DSICHardRev.IsXOS (v i)) :
∃ A : Fin n → Finset (Fin m), IsAllocation A ∧
∀ i : Fin n, 5 / 16 * LittleCharity.MMS.mms (v i) n Finset.univ ≤ v i (A i) := by sorry
end SubadditiveMMS580.Amplification.Supplement
Source
Bo Li, Ankang Sun, Toward Constant-Factor Maximin Share Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations, STOC 2027 submission #580 (October 2026), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/580.pdf, sha256 7de124b5706e9e49301a281a1eb418a8ae32d04bf4cf0941b969cc3cde85e485, Theorem 1.3, p. 4 (PDF p. 4)