Proposition 3, p. 17 (PDF p. 20) — equilibrium common ownership is decreasing in ξ and increasing in γ
ProvedCommonOwnership.Governance.proposition3_monotoneLet and , let the monitoring cost be quadratic, , and let industry profit be , where is the common-ownership weight (17) and is a function with for all , the same for all values of and .
For parameters with and , let be an optimal monitoring rule (for every , maximizes over ), and call an equilibrium level of common ownership if maximizes over the joint surplus
Then:
- Decreasing in . If and , every equilibrium at and every equilibrium at satisfy
- Increasing in . If and , every equilibrium at and every equilibrium at satisfy
Fewer opportunities for managers to divert profits (lower ) raise common ownership, while cheaper monitoring (lower ) lowers it, although both improve corporate governance.
Formalization Note Equilibrium ownership is taken, as in §4.2, to be a maximizer of the symmetric surplus (13) over ; Proposition 1 (the bargaining reduction) and §4.2's concavity remark are not assumed. Industry profit enters through an arbitrary positive function of , so the theorem covers the equilibrium industry profit of every product-market model of §3.1.3. Monitoring is any optimal rule at each parameter value, not the closed form (21). Monotonicity is weak and holds for every pair of equilibria, since the equilibrium can be at both parameter values. The bound is the paper's assumption; (a fraction) and positivity of are disclosed pins.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CommonOwnership_Governance_Model
namespace CommonOwnership.Governance
/-- Proposition 3, p. 17: under the quadratic cost (20), the equilibrium level of common
ownership is monotonically decreasing in `ξ` and monotonically increasing in `γ`: every
equilibrium stake at the larger `ξ` is at most every equilibrium stake at the smaller `ξ`
(`γ` fixed), and every equilibrium stake at the larger `γ` is at least every equilibrium
stake at the smaller `γ` (`ξ` fixed). Monitoring is the blockholder's optimum at each
parameter value; industry profit `P(λ)` is one positive function of `λ` shared by both. -/
theorem proposition3_monotone (θ β : ℝ) (hθ : 0 < θ) (hθ1 : θ ≤ 1) (hβ : 0 < β) (hβ1 : β ≤ 1)
(P : ℝ → ℝ) (hP : ∀ l ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) 1, 0 < P l) :
(∀ (ξ₁ ξ₂ γ : ℝ) (m₁ m₂ : ℝ → ℝ) (s₁ s₂ : ℝ),
0 < ξ₁ → ξ₁ < ξ₂ → ξ₂ < 1 → ξ₂ < γ →
IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ) ξ₁ β m₁ → IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ) ξ₂ β m₂ →
IsEqOwnership (jointSurplus (quadCost γ) m₁ P θ β ξ₁) β s₁ →
IsEqOwnership (jointSurplus (quadCost γ) m₂ P θ β ξ₂) β s₂ → s₂ ≤ s₁) ∧
(∀ (ξ γ₁ γ₂ : ℝ) (m₁ m₂ : ℝ → ℝ) (s₁ s₂ : ℝ),
0 < ξ → ξ < 1 → ξ < γ₁ → γ₁ < γ₂ →
IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ₁) ξ β m₁ → IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ₂) ξ β m₂ →
IsEqOwnership (jointSurplus (quadCost γ₁) m₁ P θ β ξ) β s₁ →
IsEqOwnership (jointSurplus (quadCost γ₂) m₂ P θ β ξ) β s₂ → s₁ ≤ s₂) := by sorry
end CommonOwnership.Governance
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.