§5.1, (1), p. 1346 — G(r|μ) = (p + s − c)r − sμ − (p + s − u)E[r − X]⁺, and the retailer buys r*_NC = min[μ + z_εσ_ε, Q]
ProvedTsayQF.NoCommit.retailer_purchasenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Let , , be the costs of Tsay (1999), let , and let , where is the standard normal distribution function. Given the signal , demand is and the retailer's expected profit from purchase is
Then:
- for every and ,
- for every and every production , a purchase maximizes over if and only if
This is the retailer's step of the backward induction: the EM's production problem anticipates this purchase.
Formalization Note enters as a real number with the hypothesis ; since is continuous and strictly increasing it exists and is unique. The case is included (then ). The constraint appears in the conjunction because a maximizer over is required to be feasible.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_NoCommit_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory open scoped NNReal
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.NoCommit
theorem retailer_purchase (D : Data) (v : ℝ≥0) (z : ℝ)
(hz : cdf (gaussianReal 0 1) z = kR D) :
(∀ r μ : ℝ, G D v r μ = (D.p + D.s - D.c) * r - D.s * μ
- (D.p + D.s - D.u) * ∫ x, max (r - x) 0 ∂(gaussianReal μ v)) ∧
∀ μ Q r : ℝ, (r ≤ Q ∧ IsMaxOn (fun r' => G D v r' μ) (Set.Iic Q) r) ↔
r = ncPurchase v z μ Q := by sorry
end TsayQF.NoCommit
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1346, §5.1, (1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.