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Lemma C.1 — unique interior investment equilibrium above (C.12)

Proved
CyberShare.Sharing.lemma_c1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 21, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cybersecurityequilibriuminvestmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Under the standing assumptions there is a positive investment-cost threshold κˉ\bar\kappaκˉ such that, for every κ>κˉ\kappa>\bar\kappaκ>κˉ and every b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1], the printed bound δ‾(κ)\underline\delta(\kappa)δ​(κ) of equation (C.12) lies strictly between 000 and a−ca-ca−c. For each attack impact δ∈(δ‾(κ),a−c)\delta\in(\underline\delta(\kappa),a-c)δ∈(δ​(κ),a−c) and every sharing profile, the investment subgame has exactly one equilibrium. Every investment prescribed at this equilibrium is interior:

0<Ki(yi,yj)<δγ,i=1,2.0<K_i(y_i,y_j)<\frac{\delta}{\gamma},\qquad i=1,2.0<Ki​(yi​,yj​)<γδ​,i=1,2.

This result supplies the subgame outcomes used to compare sharing decisions in Proposition 2.

Formalization Note The bound is the paper's printed (C.12), treated as sufficient for interiority. The printed claim that it is the unique threshold is stronger than the displayed formula supports; the mission does not claim necessity. Uniqueness ranges over all investment equilibria, including any boundary candidate, while the unique equilibrium is interior.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CyberShare_Sharing_Model
Formal statement
namespace CyberShare.Sharing

/-- Lemma C.1, p. A.3 (PDF 35), with the printed sufficient bound (C.12), p. A.8 (PDF 40). -/
theorem lemma_c1 (a c gamma thL thH rho lam : ℝ)
    (h : BaseStanding a c gamma thL thH rho lam) :
    ∃ kappaBar : ℝ, 0 < kappaBar ∧ ∀ kappa : ℝ, kappaBar < kappa →
      ∀ b : ℝ, 0 ≤ b → b ≤ 1 →
        let P0 : Params := ⟨a, b, c, 0, gamma, kappa, thL, thH, rho, lam⟩
        0 < deltaLow P0 ∧ deltaLow P0 < a - c ∧
        ∀ delta : ℝ, deltaLow P0 < delta → delta < a - c →
          let P : Params := { P0 with delta := delta }
          ∀ s1 s2 : Dec,
            ∃ pair : (Sig → Sig → ℝ) × (Sig → Sig → ℝ),
              IsInvEq P s1 s2 pair.1 pair.2 ∧
              (∀ y y' : Sig, 0 < pair.1 y y' ∧ pair.1 y y' < delta / gamma ∧
                0 < pair.2 y y' ∧ pair.2 y y' < delta / gamma) ∧
              ∀ pair' : (Sig → Sig → ℝ) × (Sig → Sig → ℝ),
                IsInvEq P s1 s2 pair'.1 pair'.2 → pair' = pair := by sorry

end CyberShare.Sharing
Source
August, Noh, Shamir & Shin, Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption and Investment in Resilience Measures, SSRN 4032257 (version of 2022-02-10), p. A.3 (PDF 35), Lemma C.1; p. A.8 (PDF 40), (C.12); https://ssrn.com/abstract=4032257
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 21, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 21, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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