Theorem 8.5 (i)-(ii): under efficient rationing and linear demand, all firms pricing at c is an equilibrium when C ≥ (a − c)/(n − 1), and all pricing at a − nC when C ≤ (a − c)/(n + 1)
ProvedRevenueManagement.bertrand_edgeworth_pure_equilibriabertrand-edgeworthcapacity-constraintsnash-equilibriumoligopolyoperations-research
In the Bertrand–Edgeworth game of firms with linear demand , , capacity each and the efficient-rationing rule: (i) if , every firm pricing at marginal cost is a pure-strategy equilibrium and all firms make zero profit; (ii) if , every firm pricing at the market-clearing price is a pure-strategy equilibrium. Part (iii), the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the intermediate range, is not part of this statement.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_competition
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem bertrand_edgeworth_pure_equilibria {n : ℕ} (hn : 2 ≤ n) (a c C : ℝ) (hac : c < a)
(hC : 0 < C) :
((a - c) / (n - 1) ≤ C →
IsBEEquilibrium a c C (fun _ : Fin n => c) ∧ ∀ i, bePayoff a c C (fun _ : Fin n => c) i = 0) ∧
(C ≤ (a - c) / (n + 1) → IsBEEquilibrium a c C (fun _ : Fin n => a - n * C)) := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 386, Theorem 8.5 (i) and (ii) (from Levitan and Shubik, Kreps and Scheinkman, Brock and Scheinkman)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.