Display (6), p. 14 — the opt-out demand, D̃_N(p̃) = (1−x)(1−p̃) for 0 ≤ p̃ ≤ 1 and 0 for 1 < p̃ < 1+x
ProvedGDPRPrivacy.PriceRise.eq6_demand_outdemandgdprmonopolyopt-outp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricingprivacy
Let . After the GDPR a consumer of type , uniform on , opts out at price iff and ; let be the mass of opt-out consumers. Then
The opt-out option is what the GDPR adds: these are the buyers whose privacy cost exceeds the opt-in benefit. They pay the price but generate no data revenue, and for prices above there are none.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRPrivacy_PriceRise_Model
Formal statement
namespace GDPRPrivacy.PriceRise
theorem eq6_demand_out (x p : ℝ) (hx0 : 0 < x) (hx1 : x < 1) :
(1 < p → p < 1 + x → demandOut x p = 0) ∧
(0 ≤ p → p ≤ 1 → demandOut x p = (1 - x) * (1 - p)) := by sorry
end GDPRPrivacy.PriceRise
Source
Choe, Matsushima & Shekhar, The Bright Side of the GDPR, ISER DP No. 1246 (June 2024), p. 14, display (6) and the sentence before it
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.