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Lemma 2 — fixed-regulation benchmark equilibrium

Proved
WangGreenTech.Regulation.lemma_2

by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

global-gamesoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1regulation

Let p=(ϵ,b,q,r,f1,fL,fH,mL,mH)p=(\epsilon,b,q,r,f_1,f_L,f_H,m_L,m_H)p=(ϵ,b,q,r,f1​,fL​,fH​,mL​,mH​) satisfy ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, b≥0b\ge0b≥0, 0≤q<10\le q<10≤q<1, r>0r>0r>0, f1,fL>0f_1,f_L>0f1​,fL​>0, fH≥fLf_H\ge f_LfH​≥fL​, and mL≤mH≤0m_L\le m_H\le0mL​≤mH​≤0. Signals and the common fundamental are real. Conditional on signal xxx, the specified posterior is uniform on [x−ϵ,x+ϵ][x-\epsilon,x+\epsilon][x−ϵ,x+ϵ]. Followers form a unit-mass population on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1); the leader has zero population mass. Both choose action 1 at indifference.

For a fixed regulation probability 0<q^<10<\widehat q<10<q​<1, put t^=b/2+fL−(1−q^)mL−q^fH\widehat t=b/2+f_L-(1-\widehat q)m_L-\widehat q f_Ht=b/2+fL​−(1−q​)mL​−q​fH​ and

UF(λ,x)=λ−f1+mL+q^(mH−mL)+x−b2ϵ∫x−ϵx+ϵAt^(θ) dθ.U_F(\lambda,x)=\lambda-f_1+m_L+\widehat q(m_H-m_L)+x-\frac b{2\epsilon}\int_{x-\epsilon}^{x+\epsilon}A_{\widehat t}(\theta)\,d\theta.UF​(λ,x)=λ−f1​+mL​+q​(mH​−mL​)+x−2ϵb​∫x−ϵx+ϵ​At​(θ)dθ.

Set D^λ={x:UF(λ,x)≥0}\widehat D_\lambda=\{x:U_F(\lambda,x)\ge0\}Dλ​={x:UF​(λ,x)≥0} and x^(1)(λ)=inf⁡D^λ\widehat x^{(1)}(\lambda)=\inf\widehat D_\lambdax(1)(λ)=infDλ​.

Suppose b≤2ϵb\le2\epsilonb≤2ϵ. Followers' threshold profile at t^\widehat tt is an adoption equilibrium, with

σ(i,x)=1⟺x≥t^,\sigma(i,x)=1\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad x\ge\widehat t,σ(i,x)=1⟺x≥t,

and conditional aggregate At^(θ)A_{\widehat t}(\theta)At​(θ). For every λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, D^λ\widehat D_\lambdaDλ​ is nonempty and bounded below and

D^λ=[x^(1)(λ),∞).\widehat D_\lambda=[\widehat x^{(1)}(\lambda),\infty).Dλ​=[x(1)(λ),∞).

Together with this follower profile, the leader's decision to develop precisely on D^λ\widehat D_\lambdaDλ​ forms a specified-belief equilibrium.

This supplies both the adoption threshold and the development cutoff for the benchmark.

Formalization Note q^\widehat qq​ is independent of aggregate adoption; it is not identified with qqq. No calibration is imposed in Lemma 2. The unused endogenous parameters q,rq,rq,r remain in the shared model record. Their admissible values do not affect the benchmark payoffs.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_WangGreenTech_Regulation_Policies

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace WangGreenTech.Regulation

open Set

theorem lemma_2 (p : Model) (hp : p.Valid) (qhat : ℝ)
    (hq0 : 0 < qhat) (hq1 : qhat < 1) (hb : p.b ≤ 2 * p.ε) :
    AdoptionEquilibrium p (fun _ => qhat) (thresholdProfile (fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat)) ∧
    (∀ θ, adoptionMass p (thresholdProfile (fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat)) θ =
      thresholdMass p (fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat) θ) ∧
    (∀ i ∈ Ico (0 : ℝ) 1, ∀ x,
      thresholdProfile (fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat) i x = true ↔ fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat ≤ x) ∧
    (∀ lam : ℝ, 0 ≤ lam →
      (fixedDevelopmentSet p qhat lam).Nonempty ∧ BddBelow (fixedDevelopmentSet p qhat lam) ∧
      fixedDevelopmentSet p qhat lam = Ici (fixedDevelopmentCutoff p qhat lam) ∧
      SpecifiedBeliefEquilibrium p (fun _ => qhat) lam
        (thresholdProfile (fixedAdoptionCutoff p qhat)) (fixedDecision p qhat lam)) := by sorry

end WangGreenTech.Regulation
Source
Wang, Cho and Scheller-Wolf, Green Technology Development and Adoption: Competition, Regulation, and Uncertainty—A Global Game Approach, Management Science forthcoming artifact, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3538, body p. 24 (PDF 24), Lemma 2(a)–(b); Appendix A p. 13 (PDF 46), equation (19)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Hypotheses. For every valid model ppp (validity: 0<ε0<\varepsilon0<ε, 0≤b0\le b0≤b, 0≤q<10\le q<10≤q<1, 0<r0<r0<r, 0<f10<f_10<f1​, 0<fL≤fH0<f_L\le f_H0<fL​≤fH​, mL≤mH≤0m_L\le m_H\le0mL​≤mH​≤0), every real q^\hat qq^​ with 0<q^<10<\hat q<10<q^​<1, and assuming b≤2εb\le2\varepsilonb≤2ε. The notation is:

  • t^=b2+fL−(1−q^)mL−q^fH\hat t=\frac b2+f_L-(1-\hat q)m_L-\hat q f_Ht^=2b​+fL​−(1−q^​)mL​−q^​fH​: the fixed adoption cutoff;
  • σt^(i,x)=true  ⟺  t^≤x\sigma_{\hat t}(i,x)=\text{true}\iff\hat t\le xσt^​(i,x)=true⟺t^≤x: the threshold profile;
  • R≡q^R\equiv\hat qR≡q^​: the constant regulation function;
  • the fixed utility
U^(λ,x)=∫(λ−f1+θ−bM^(θ)+q^mH+(1−q^)mL) dΠx(θ),\hat U(\lambda,x)=\int\bigl(\lambda-f_1+\theta-b\hat M(\theta)+\hat q m_H+(1-\hat q)m_L\bigr)\,d\Pi_x(\theta),U^(λ,x)=∫(λ−f1​+θ−bM^(θ)+q^​mH​+(1−q^​)mL​)dΠx​(θ),

where Πx\Pi_xΠx​ is the uniform law on [x−ε,x+ε][x-\varepsilon,x+\varepsilon][x−ε,x+ε] and M^(θ)=min⁡(1,max⁡(0,(θ+ε−t^)/(2ε)))\hat M(\theta)=\min(1,\max(0,(\theta+\varepsilon-\hat t)/(2\varepsilon)))M^(θ)=min(1,max(0,(θ+ε−t^)/(2ε)));

  • D^(λ)={x:0≤U^(λ,x)}\hat D(\lambda)=\{x:0\le\hat U(\lambda,x)\}D^(λ)={x:0≤U^(λ,x)}, with x^(λ)=inf⁡D^(λ)\hat x(\lambda)=\inf\hat D(\lambda)x^(λ)=infD^(λ) (real infimum, 000 if empty or unbounded below);
  • d^λ(x)=true  ⟺  0≤U^(λ,x)\hat d_\lambda(x)=\text{true}\iff0\le\hat U(\lambda,x)d^λ​(x)=true⟺0≤U^(λ,x).

Conclusions. All of the following hold:

  1. (R,σt^)(R,\sigma_{\hat t})(R,σt^​) is an adoption equilibrium. This means:

    • σt^\sigma_{\hat t}σt^​ is measurable;
    • follower payoffs are integrable under every posterior;
    • for every i∈[0,1)i\in[0,1)i∈[0,1) and every xxx, σt^(i,x)\sigma_{\hat t}(i,x)σt^​(i,x) maximises the posterior expected follower payoff, with ties to adoption.

    The follower payoff is −fL+θ−bα+q^mH+(1−q^)mL-f_L+\theta-b\alpha+\hat q m_H+(1-\hat q)m_L−fL​+θ−bα+q^​mH​+(1−q^​)mL​ if adopting and q^(mH−fH)\hat q(m_H-f_H)q^​(mH​−fH​) if not, with α\alphaα the adoption mass of σt^\sigma_{\hat t}σt^​.

  2. For every θ\thetaθ, the adoption mass of σt^\sigma_{\hat t}σt^​ equals M^(θ)\hat M(\theta)M^(θ). The adoption mass is the Lebesgue integral over i∈[0,1)i\in[0,1)i∈[0,1) of the uniform-law probability that σt^(i,x)\sigma_{\hat t}(i,x)σt^​(i,x) is true.

  3. For every i∈[0,1)i\in[0,1)i∈[0,1) and every xxx: σt^(i,x)=true\sigma_{\hat t}(i,x)=\text{true}σt^​(i,x)=true iff t^≤x\hat t\le xt^≤x. This is the defining property of the threshold profile.

  4. For every λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0:

    • D^(λ)\hat D(\lambda)D^(λ) is nonempty and bounded below;
    • D^(λ)=[x^(λ),∞)\hat D(\lambda)=[\hat x(\lambda),\infty)D^(λ)=[x^(λ),∞);
    • (R,λ,σt^,d^λ)(R,\lambda,\sigma_{\hat t},\hat d_\lambda)(R,λ,σt^​,d^λ​) is a specified-belief equilibrium.

    The equilibrium claim means the adoption equilibrium of item 1, together with all of the following:

    • d^λ\hat d_\lambdad^λ​ is measurable.
    • Leader payoffs are integrable.
    • For every xxx, d^λ(x)\hat d_\lambda(x)d^λ​(x) gives a posterior expected leader payoff at least that of either action. The leader payoff is λ−f1+θ−bα+q^mH+(1−q^)mL\lambda-f_1+\theta-b\alpha+\hat q m_H+(1-\hat q)m_Lλ−f1​+θ−bα+q^​mH​+(1−q^​)mL​ if developing and 000 if not.
    • d^λ(x)=true\hat d_\lambda(x)=\text{true}d^λ​(x)=true whenever the expected development payoff equals 000.

Degenerate cases. q^\hat qq^​ is an arbitrary number in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), not linked to qqq or rrr. The endpoints q^=0,1\hat q=0,1q^​=0,1 and λ<0\lambda<0λ<0 are not covered. Validity gives ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, so no division by zero or zero posterior occurs.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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