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(4), App. B, PDF p. 33 — under pay-by-delivery the supplier produces exactly q below c/(α(1−θ)), anything in [q, q/α] at it, and exactly q/α above it

Proved
YieldPostpone.Interplay.eq_4

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1production-inflationrandom-yieldsupply-chain

Consider a pay-by-delivery scenario (DA or DR) with parameters a,b>0a,b>0a,b>0, 0<α,θ<10<\alpha,\theta<10<α,θ<1, μ=α(1−θ)+θ\mu=\alpha(1-\theta)+\thetaμ=α(1−θ)+θ and cost 0<c<aμ/b0<c<a\mu/b0<c<aμ/b. Fix a wholesale price www with c/μ<w<a/bc/\mu<w<a/bc/μ<w<a/b and an order q>0q>0q>0. The supplier's expected profit from producing Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 is

πS(Q)=−cQ+θwmin⁡{Q,q}+(1−θ)wmin⁡{αQ,q}.\pi_S(Q)=-cQ+\theta w\min\{Q,q\}+(1-\theta)w\min\{\alpha Q,q\}.πS​(Q)=−cQ+θwmin{Q,q}+(1−θ)wmin{αQ,q}.

Let w0=c/(α(1−θ))w_0=c/(\alpha(1-\theta))w0​=c/(α(1−θ)).

  1. If w<w0w<w_0w<w0​, then Q=qQ=qQ=q is the unique maximizer of πS\pi_SπS​ over Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0, and the delivered quantity is q^=Yq\hat q=Yqq^​=Yq (that is, qqq when Y=1Y=1Y=1 and αq\alpha qαq when Y=αY=\alphaY=α).
  2. If w=w0w=w_0w=w0​, the maximizers of πS\pi_SπS​ over Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 are exactly the QQQ with q≤Q≤q/αq\le Q\le q/\alphaq≤Q≤q/α; in particular the page's choice Q=q/αQ=q/\alphaQ=q/α is optimal.
  3. If w>w0w>w_0w>w0​, then Q=q/αQ=q/\alphaQ=q/α is the unique maximizer, and the delivered quantity is q^=q\hat q=qq^​=q in both yield states.

This is the supplier's production response used in every pay-by-delivery equilibrium: below w0w_0w0​ it never inflates production, above w0w_0w0​ it inflates to secure full delivery.

Formalization Note The page assigns the tie w=w0w=w_0w=w0​ to inflation. At w=w0w=w_0w=w0​ every Q∈[q,q/α]Q\in[q,q/\alpha]Q∈[q,q/α] is optimal, so the tie is a selection, not a property of the maximizers: the statement gives the whole set of maximizers at w=w0w=w_0w=w0​ (which contains the page's Q=q/αQ=q/\alphaQ=q/α), and the mission's equilibrium predicate selects Q=qQ=qQ=q there (see the Setting). The order q>0q>0q>0 is assumed; at q=0q=0q=0 the only maximizer is Q=0Q=0Q=0.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_YieldPostpone_Interplay_Setting
Formal statement
namespace YieldPostpone.Interplay

theorem eq_4 (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) (c : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcμ : c < P.a * μ P / P.b)
    (k : Scenario) (hk : k.byDelivery = true) (w q : ℝ) (hw : wAdm P c k w) (hq : 0 < q) :
    (w < c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) →
      (∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
        ((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔ Q = q)) ∧
      delivered 1 q q = q ∧ delivered P.α q q = P.α * q) ∧
    (w = c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) →
      ∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
        ((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔
          (q ≤ Q ∧ Q ≤ q / P.α))) ∧
    (c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) < w →
      (∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
        ((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔
          Q = q / P.α)) ∧
      delivered 1 (q / P.α) q = q ∧ delivered P.α (q / P.α) q = q) := by sorry

end YieldPostpone.Interplay
Source
Geng, Guo, Xiao, Yang, Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement?, SSRN 3546872 (author version), App. B, PDF p. 33 (appendix p. 1), display (4)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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