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Theorem 4, PDF p. 6 — the price of anarchy for two links with speeds s₁ ≤ s₂ ≤ φs₁ is at least R = 1 + s₂/(s₁ + s₂), and R ≤ φ with equality at s₂/s₁ = φ

Proved
WorstCaseEq.Speeds.theorem4_two_speeds_lower_bound

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

golden-ratioload-balancingnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchyrelated-machines

Consider load balancing on two parallel links with speeds s1≤s2s_1\le s_2s1​≤s2​: each agent sends its traffic over one link, an agent on link jjj carrying total traffic LLL experiences delay L/sjL/s_jL/sj​, the social cost of a mixed profile is the expected maximum over the links of load divided by speed, and opt⁡\operatorname{opt}opt is the least such maximum over pure assignments. Let φ=(1+5)/2\varphi=(1+\sqrt5)/2φ=(1+5​)/2 and suppose

0<s1≤s2≤φ s1.0<s_1\le s_2\le\varphi\,s_1 .0<s1​≤s2​≤φs1​.

Then:

  1. (Lower bound.) The price of anarchy is at least R=1+s2/(s1+s2)R=1+s_2/(s_1+s_2)R=1+s2​/(s1​+s2​): there are finitely many agents with positive traffic and a Nash equilibrium ppp of this game with opt⁡>0\operatorname{opt}>0opt>0 and
cost⁡(p)=(1+s2s1+s2)opt⁡.\operatorname{cost}(p)=\Big(1+\frac{s_2}{s_1+s_2}\Big)\operatorname{opt}.cost(p)=(1+s1​+s2​s2​​)opt.
  1. (Maximum value.) R≤φR\le\varphiR≤φ on this range.
  2. (Attained.) If s2/s1=φs_2/s_1=\varphis2​/s1​=φ then R=φR=\varphiR=φ.

With identical links (s1=s2s_1=s_2s1​=s2​) the bound is 3/23/23/2, the lower bound of Theorem 1 for two links; the theorem shows that unequal speeds push the worst-case ratio up to the golden ratio.

Formalization Note "The price of anarchy is at least RRR" is stated as the existence of an instance and an equilibrium whose social cost equals RRR times a positive optimum, rather than through a supremum or a quotient (a quotient would take the junk value 000 when opt⁡=0\operatorname{opt}=0opt=0). The speed vector is ![s₁, s₂] (the paper's links 1, 2 are 0, 1). The ratio conditions are written s2≤φs1s_2\le\varphi s_1s2​≤φs1​ and s2=φs1s_2=\varphi s_1s2​=φs1​, equivalent because s1>0s_1>0s1​>0. Positive traffic wi>0w_i>0wi​>0 is part of the model and is required of the witness. The social cost with speeds is not printed in the paper; the definition used (expected maximum of load divided by speed) is the one its cost computation uses.


Retired 2026-10-27: a Lean-vs-paper fidelity audit found this statement weaker than, or narrower than, the cited result. A corrected statement will be resubmitted.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_WorstCaseEq_Speeds_Model
Formal statement
namespace WorstCaseEq.Speeds

theorem theorem4_two_speeds_lower_bound (s₁ s₂ : ℝ) (h₁ : 0 < s₁) (h₁₂ : s₁ ≤ s₂)
    (hφ : s₂ ≤ Real.goldenRatio * s₁) :
    (∃ (n : ℕ) (w : Fin n → ℝ) (p : Fin n → Fin 2 → ℝ),
        (∀ i, 0 < w i) ∧ IsNash w ![s₁, s₂] p ∧ 0 < opt w ![s₁, s₂] ∧
          socialCost w ![s₁, s₂] p = (1 + s₂ / (s₁ + s₂)) * opt w ![s₁, s₂]) ∧
      1 + s₂ / (s₁ + s₂) ≤ Real.goldenRatio ∧
      (s₂ = Real.goldenRatio * s₁ → 1 + s₂ / (s₁ + s₂) = Real.goldenRatio) := by sorry

end WorstCaseEq.Speeds
Source
Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria (journal version, 2009), PDF p. 6, Theorem 4
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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