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Theorem E.3 — no finite ratio on superlinear group effects

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FairFacilityLoc.Supplement.theorem_E_3

by iris · Nov 17, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theoryfacility-locationmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Fix a positive dimension ddd and 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1. The function

Eε(s,t)=min⁡{s,t}+εmax⁡{s,t}1+εE_\varepsilon(s,t)=\frac{\min\{s,t\}+\varepsilon\max\{s,t\}}{1+\varepsilon}Eε​(s,t)=1+εmin{s,t}+εmax{s,t}​

is a nonzero, monotone, symmetric and superlinear group effect, and Eε(1,1)=1E_\varepsilon(1,1)=1Eε​(1,1)=1.

Every deterministic strategyproof mechanism has ratio at least

14ε\frac{1}{4\varepsilon}4ε1​

on the fixed structure of two disjoint two-agent groups, both using EεE_\varepsilonEε​. Consequently, the supremum of its ratio over all superlinear group effects is infinite. This holds in every positive dimension and requires neither anonymity, continuity nor coordinate independence.

The finite bound belongs to each fixed ε\varepsilonε; the infinite class-wide conclusion ranges over the whole family as ε\varepsilonε approaches zero.

Formalization Note The ratio is valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with 0/0=10/0=10/0=1 and a/0=∞a/0=\inftya/0=∞ for a>0a>0a>0.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: every dimension → a natural number ddd with 1≤d1\le d1≤d and locations in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d); reason: the paper’s Euclidean dimensions are positive
  • encoding: 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1 real and EεE_\varepsilonEε​ on two nonnegative real coordinates → ε : ℝ≥0 with the same strict bounds and epsilonEffect ε : (Fin 2 → ℝ≥0) → ℝ≥0; reason: positivity makes the parameter nonnegative, and Fin 2 is the same two-coordinate domain with 0-based indexing
  • encoding: the group structure of Lemma E.2 → epsilonTwoByTwo ε on Fin 4 agents and Fin 2 groups; reason: it fixes labels for the same two disjoint two-agent groups
  • encoding: mechanisms and ratios range over group effects in the sense of Definition 2.1 → GeneralMechanism is total on raw GeneralGroupStructure data while GeneralIsStrategyproof and superlinearRatio explicitly require IsGeneralGroupStructure; reason: separating admissibility keeps the printed group-effect conclusion for EεE_\varepsilonEε​ visible, and raw inadmissible inputs are excluded from every semantic quantifier
  • encoding: ratio at least 1/(4ε)1/(4\varepsilon)1/(4ε) and no finite ratio on the class → an inequality and superlinearRatio M = ⊤ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; reason: top is exactly the absence of a finite upper bound
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FairFacilityLoc_Supplement_epsilonEffect

open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace FairFacilityLoc.Supplement

set_option autoImplicit false

/-- **Theorem E.3** (Yan–Zhou, *Fair and Strategyproof Facility Location in Euclidean Space*,
manuscript, sha256 642a1268…, pp.91–92, PDF pp.93–94). For `0 < ε < 1`, the exact effect
`E_ε(s,t) = (min{s,t} + ε max{s,t})/(1+ε)` is monotone, symmetric, superlinear and normalized
by `E_ε(1,1)=1`. Every strategyproof mechanism has ratio at least `1/(4ε)` on the fixed
two-disjoint-two-agent structure using this effect. Consequently its ratio over all superlinear
group effects is infinite, in every positive dimension.

**Formalization Note.** The first conjunct packages “monotone, symmetric” together with the
paper's standing nonzero condition as `IsGroupEffect`. The exact four-agent structure is
`epsilonTwoByTwo ε`. Ratios are in `ℝ≥0∞` with `0/0=1` and `a/0=∞`. No anonymity,
continuity, coordinate independence, or finite-ratio hypothesis is imposed. -/
theorem theorem_E_3 (d : ℕ) (hd : 1 ≤ d) (ε : ℝ≥0) (hε0 : 0 < ε) (hε1 : ε < 1)
    (M : GeneralMechanism d) (hsp : GeneralIsStrategyproof M) :
    FairFacilityLoc.IsGroupEffect (epsilonEffect ε) ∧
      IsSuperlinearEffect (epsilonEffect ε) ∧
      epsilonEffect ε 1 = 1 ∧
      (((1 / (4 * ε) : ℝ≥0) : ℝ≥0∞) ≤ ratioOn M (epsilonTwoByTwo ε)) ∧
      superlinearRatio M = ⊤ := by sorry

end FairFacilityLoc.Supplement
Source
Yan, Zhou, Fair and Strategyproof Facility Location in Euclidean Space, manuscript (sha256 642a1268…), Theorem E.3, pp.91–92 (PDF pp.93–94), equation (E.3)

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