QKD sufficient-security criterion (4)
OpenQAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P22.qkdCriterionLet have dimension , where , and let . Fix a normalized purification of the Hilbert–Schmidt de Finetti state. Let be the CPTP map induced by a QKD protocol, with classical outputs consisting of a finite length branch, two keys of that branch's length, and the full public transcript. Length zero is allowed. Define to preserve the length and transcript while replacing both keys by an identical uniform key of that length, and construct . Suppose every input permutation has a CPTP output relabeling that gives covariance for both and . For ,
This is the source's sufficient criterion for general security, with full norms and no hashing-shortening premise. The independent identical local measurements and classical processing enter through their induced channel .
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Support50_P22
noncomputable section
open scoped Matrix ComplexConjugate ComplexOrder Matrix.Norms.L2Operator
open MeasureTheory
namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P22
attribute [local instance] Classical.decEq Classical.propDecidable
open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Gap48.P20 (Copies)
open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P69 (diamond)
open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Dependency50.P18 (ClassicalOutput)
attribute [local instance] QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P22.postselectionMatrixMeasurableSpace
attribute [local instance] QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P22.postselectionMatrixBorelSpace
/-- QKD sufficient-security criterion, equation (4), PDF p.3 (not p.2).
H has dimension a*b for the Alice--Bob pair; all norm factors are full norms.
The same output channel witnesses covariance for E and the constructed F. -/
theorem qkdCriterion (n a b : ℕ) (ha : 0 < a) (hb : 0 < b)
{R L C : Type} [Fintype R] [DecidableEq R] [Nonempty R]
[Fintype L] [DecidableEq L] [Nonempty L]
[Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
(len : L → ℕ)
(psi : EuclideanSpace ℂ (Copies (Fin (a*b)) n × R))
(hpsi : FinitePurification psi (deFinettiState n (a*b) (Nat.mul_pos ha hb)))
(E : Matrix (Copies (Fin (a*b)) n) (Copies (Fin (a*b)) n) ℂ →ₗ[ℂ]
Matrix (KeyOut L C len) (KeyOut L C len) ℂ)
(hE : IsChannel E) (hclass : ClassicalOutput E)
(hcov : ∀ pi : Equiv.Perm (Fin n), ∃ K : Superop (KeyOut L C len) (KeyOut L C len),
IsChannel K ∧ (∀ X, E (permuteInput pi X) = K (E X)) ∧
(∀ X, idealProtocol len E (permuteInput pi X) = K (idealProtocol len E X)))
(epsilon : ℝ) (hepsilon : 0 ≤ epsilon)
(htest : traceNorm (tensorId (E - idealProtocol len E) (pureDensity psi)) ≤
epsilon / (n+1 : ℝ) ^ ((a*b)^2-1)) :
diamond (E - idealProtocol len E) ≤ epsilon := by sorry
end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P22
end
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol
Let , with and , put and , and let be finite nonempty types with decidable equality. Fix , and let consist of indices with . Let satisfy and
where is the law obtained by taking for a Haar-distributed unitary on , reshaping this vector as using the finite-product indexing, and setting . Let be a complex linear map from matrices on to matrices on , assume it is a channel, and assume for every matrix whenever . Here a channel means a map of the form for finitely many matrices satisfying . Define by taking , discarding its off-diagonal entries, and replacing the key pair at each fixed by equal uniform keys: its diagonal entry at is if , and zero otherwise. For each permutation of the positions, write , and suppose there exists a channel on such that, for every ,
For any real , if
then . In these formulas, , , and a map acts by applying to each fixed reference block . The diamond quantity is exactly
with no positivity or Hermiticity restriction on . The statement includes , when is a singleton, and key lengths may be zero.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.