(A.3), App. p. 1 — trial-effort first-order condition and m∗(N) = A(N−1)/(N²c₃)
ProvedProblemSpec.Equilibrium.eq_A_3crowdsourcingfirst-order-conditionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1trial-effort
Fix participants, , and a symmetric profile in which every designer plays with . A participant's expected utility , as a function of her own number of trials , is differentiable at with derivative
and this derivative vanishes if and only if
This is the first-order condition that pins down the equilibrium trial effort.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ProblemSpec_Equilibrium_Model
Formal statement
namespace ProblemSpec.Equilibrium
/-- (A.3), App. p. 1 (PDF 29). At a symmetric profile (`ri = r`, `mi = m > 0`, `N > 1`), a
participant's expected utility is differentiable in her number of trials `mi` at `mi = m`, with
derivative `A (N−1) m / (m N)² − c3`, `c3 = h(Sg)`; this derivative vanishes exactly when
`m = m∗(N) = A(N−1)/(N² c3)`. -/
theorem eq_A_3 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (Sr Sg N r m : ℝ) (hSg : 0 ≤ Sg) (hN : 1 < N)
(hm : 0 < m) :
HasDerivAt (fun x => payoff P Sr Sg N r x r m)
(P.A * ((N - 1) * m / (m * N) ^ 2) - P.h Sg) m ∧
(P.A * ((N - 1) * m / (m * N) ^ 2) - P.h Sg = 0 ↔ m = mstar P Sg N) := by sorry
end ProblemSpec.Equilibrium
Source
Jiang, Huang & Beil, The Role of Problem Specification in Crowdsourcing Contests for Design Problems, SSRN 3260862 (version of 30 Oct 2019), App. p. 1 (PDF 29), (A.3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.