Proof of Proposition 2, p. 20 — F^(2)_n(p) = nF^(1)_{n−1}(p) − (n−1)F^(1)_n(p) for exchangeable F (David–Nagaraja 5.3.2)
ProvedRobustSPA.Affiliated.second_order_stat_identityexchangeabilityorder-statisticsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let and let be an exchangeable law of supported on . Let be the CDF of the second-highest valuation, the CDF of the highest valuation, and the CDF of . Then for every real ,
The identity expresses the CDF of the second-highest valuation, which governs the revenue of a second-price auction, through the CDFs of maxima. In the proof of Proposition 2 it is used to eliminate from the regret expression of Proposition 1.
Formalization Note. The paper quotes the identity from David and Nagaraja (2003), equation 5.3.2, without proof. Only exchangeability is assumed, as the identity requires; affiliation is not needed. is the range in which is defined by Definition 5.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RobustSPA_Affiliated_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RobustSPA.Affiliated
open MeasureTheory RobustSPA.IID
theorem second_order_stat_identity (n : ℕ) (hn : 2 ≤ n) (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (hμ : μ ∈ Fexc n) :
∀ p : ℝ, F2 μ p = (n : ℝ) * F1k (n - 1) μ p - ((n : ℝ) - 1) * F1 μ p := by sorry
end RobustSPA.Affiliated
Source
Anunrojwong, Balseiro & Besbes, On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design, arXiv:2204.10478v5, p. 20, proof of Proposition 2 (quoting David & Nagaraja 2003, eq. 5.3.2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.