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§4, p. 1345 — Q*_CC = F^{-1}((p + s − m)/(p + s − u)) is the unique optimal centralized production

Proved
TsayQF.NoCommit.cc_optimal

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

critical-fractilenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Consider the supply chain of Tsay (1999) with costs p>c>m>0p > c > m > 0p>c>m>0, u<mu < mu<m, s≥0s \ge 0s≥0, demand X=μ+εX = \mu + \varepsilonX=μ+ε with μ∼ν\mu \sim \nuμ∼ν independent of ε∼N(0,σε2)\varepsilon \sim N(0,\sigma_\varepsilon^2)ε∼N(0,σε2​), and suppose the distribution function Θ\ThetaΘ of μ\muμ is differentiable and strictly increasing and μ\muμ has finite variance. Let FFF be the distribution function of XXX and

ΠCC(Q)=EX{pmin⁡[X,Q]−s[X−Q]++u[Q−X]+}−mQ\Pi_{CC}(Q) = E_X\{p\min[X,Q] - s[X-Q]^+ + u[Q-X]^+\} - mQΠCC​(Q)=EX​{pmin[X,Q]−s[X−Q]++u[Q−X]+}−mQ

the expected profit of a central planner producing QQQ before the demand signal. Then some QQQ solves

F(Q)=p+s−mp+s−u,F(Q) = \frac{p+s-m}{p+s-u},F(Q)=p+s−up+s−m​,

and a production QQQ maximizes ΠCC\Pi_{CC}ΠCC​ over R\mathbb RR if and only if it solves this equation.

Since FFF is strictly increasing, this is the unique centralized optimum QCC∗=F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u))Q^*_{CC} = F^{-1}\big((p+s-m)/(p+s-u)\big)QCC∗​=F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u)), the efficiency benchmark against which the decentralized arrangements are measured.

Formalization Note F−1F^{-1}F−1 is not a Lean function here: the statement gives existence of a solution and characterizes the maximizers by the equation. Productions range over all of R\mathbb RR; the paper's presumption that demand is almost certainly nonnegative is not needed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_NoCommit_Model
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
open scoped NNReal
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.NoCommit

theorem cc_optimal (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    (hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
    (v : ℝ≥0) :
    (∃ Q : ℝ, cdf (lawX ν v) Q = kS D) ∧
      ∀ Q : ℝ, IsMaxOn (ccProfit D ν v) Set.univ Q ↔ cdf (lawX ν v) Q = kS D := by sorry

end TsayQF.NoCommit
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1345, §4
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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