Proof of Theorem 3.2, (16)–(21), p. 13 — in a (λ, µ)-smooth game with µ < 1, every coarse correlated equilibrium has E[C(s)] ≤ λ/(1 − µ)·C(s*)
ProvedRobustPoA.Static.chain_16_21coarse-correlated-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchysmooth-games
Let be a cost-minimization game with players , player costs and joint cost , and suppose is -smooth with . Then for every coarse correlated equilibrium of and every outcome ,
This is the conclusion of the chain (16)–(21) in the proof of Theorem 3.2, for one fixed smoothness pair ; taking the infimum over admissible pairs gives Theorem 3.2.
Formalization Note Distributions are finitely supported probability weights on outcomes (see the definition item). No sign condition on and no nonnegativity of costs is needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RobustPoA_Static_Game import Definitions.Def_RobustPoA_Static_Smoothness import Definitions.Def_RobustPoA_Static_Distribution
Formal statement
namespace RobustPoA.Static
theorem chain_16_21 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type*}
(C : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (lam mu : ℝ)
(hsmooth : IsSmooth C lam mu) (hmu : mu < 1)
(σ : (∀ i, S i) →₀ ℝ) (hσ : IsCCE C σ) (sstar : ∀ i, S i) :
expect σ (cost C) ≤ lam / (1 - mu) * cost C sstar := by sorry
end RobustPoA.Static
Source
Roughgarden, Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, J. ACM 62(5) (2015), proof of Theorem 3.2, (16)–(21), p. 13
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.