Theorem 4.19 — one-sided AMM incentive compatibility
OpenSybilClinch.Supplement.theorem_4_19automated-market-makerclinching-auctionmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sybil-proofness
Fix an admissible AMM and all reports of a finite set of other sell- traders. A physical eligible sell- trader has true type with and may either report truthfully as one merged identity or replace that identity by an arbitrary finite set of sell- identities. The Sybil identities may report arbitrary finite nonnegative values, while their aggregate reported budget must satisfy .
For every completed merged run and completed Sybil run of the one-sided AMM clinching mechanism,
Hence the one-sided mechanism is Sybil-robust incentive compatible under the aggregate same-direction budget cap.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: finite sell- report profiles and completed one-sided AMM executions → published
OneSidedProfilevalues inWithTop ℝwith explicit finiteness hypotheses and publishedIsRunrelations forchordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0; reason: these are the base mission's exact encodings of the paper's one-sided profiles and mechanism - encoding: a physical trader and its arbitrary finite Sybil identities → a merged label and a disjoint
Finset ℕgroup, with true utility computed from aggregate allocation and current-price payment; reason: labels carry no mathematical structure and aggregate is equation (5) on this affordable same-direction domain
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_AdmissibleAMM_C import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_AdmissibleAMM_p0 import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_chordMech import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_IsRun import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_OneSidedProfile_Valid import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_Run_alloc import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_Run_payOf set_option autoImplicit false open Filter Topology Set MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace SybilClinch
namespace Supplement
/-- Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, *Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and
Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design*, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256
93c5d05b05cc8b80b5bb5c0ac677b9642e119277d82de797234b0242f7c5021c), Theorem 4.19
(One-sided AMM incentive compatibility), printed p.25 (PDF p.27).
Fix every report of the other sell-`Y` traders. For a physical eligible sell-`Y` trader of true
type `(V,Q)`, participation as the truthful merged identity weakly dominates replacement by any
finite set `G` of sell-`Y` identities with arbitrary finite nonnegative reported values and
aggregate reported budget at most `Q`.
**Formalization Note.** Both sides are terminal true utilities `V X - Y` of completed runs of the
published one-sided AMM mechanism `chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0`; validity and finiteness cover every
finite nonnegative report, including values above `V` or below the eligibility threshold. -/
theorem theorem_4_19 (A : AdmissibleAMM) (N G : Finset ℕ) (i₀ : ℕ)
(hi₀ : i₀ ∉ N) (hNG : Disjoint N G) (PM PS : OneSidedProfile)
(hPM : PM.ids = insert i₀ N) (hPS : PS.ids = N ∪ G)
(hNrep : ∀ j ∈ N, PM.v j = PS.v j ∧ PM.q j = PS.q j)
(hvalM : PM.Valid) (hvalS : PS.Valid) (hfinM : ∀ i ∈ PM.ids, PM.v i ≠ ⊤)
(hfinS : ∀ i ∈ PS.ids, PS.v i ≠ ⊤)
(V Q : ℝ) (hV : A.p0 ≤ V)
(hvi₀ : PM.v i₀ = (V : WithTop ℝ)) (hqi₀ : PM.q i₀ = Q)
(hqG : ∑ i ∈ G, PS.q i ≤ Q) (RM RS : Run)
(hRM : IsRun (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) PM RM)
(hRS : IsRun (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) PS RS) :
V * RS.alloc G RS.pf - RS.payOf (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) G RS.pf ≤
V * RM.x i₀ RM.pf - RM.pay (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) i₀ RM.pf := by sorry
end Supplement
end SybilClinch
Source
Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256 93c5d05b…), Theorem 4.19, printed p.25 (PDF p.27), with strategy (43), printed p.21 (PDF p.23)