(4), p. 9 — for a fee f ≥ 0 the seller's unique optimal direct price is v − f/2 if f ≤ 2μ and v − μ if f ≥ 2μ
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.eq_4Consider the baseline leakage game with value , marginal cost , and switching costs uniform on , . Let be the marketplace's per-transaction fee. Then a direct price maximizes the seller's profit
over all if and only if
In particular the seller's best response exists and is unique for every nonnegative fee.
This is the seller's best-response function of the baseline model: at moderate fees the seller undercuts the marketplace price by half the fee, and at high fees it prices low enough to divert every buyer to its direct channel.
Formalization Note. The paper prefaces (4) with "Assuming "; the display in fact needs (for the formula exceeds , and the optimum is ), and holds for every whether or not . The statement is therefore posed for . The two branches agree at ; Lean writes the first branch for . The standing assumption is kept as a hypothesis.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Baseline_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
/-- (4), p. 9: for `μ > 0` and any fee `f ≥ 0`, the seller's profit-maximizing direct price is
unique and equals `v − μ` if `f ≥ 2μ` and `v − f/2` if `f ≤ 2μ` (the branches agree at
`f = 2μ`). The page's "Assuming f ≤ v − c" is replaced by `0 ≤ f`, which is what the display
needs (for `f < 0` the optimum is `p_d = v`). -/
theorem eq_4 (v c μ : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (f : ℝ) (hf : 0 ≤ f) (pd : ℝ) :
IsSOpt v c μ f pd ↔ pd = (if 2 * μ ≤ f then v - μ else v - f / 2) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.