α-strong regularity, , anonymous posted-price revenue and monopoly reserves
DefinitionLotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_StrongRegularityThese definitions extend the published value laws (density on , optional terminal atom at a finite , virtual value with , and ).
- α-strong regularity (Definition A.2). For , is α-strongly regular if
For this is exactly the published regularity; is the monotone hazard rate condition. 2. The constant for and , defined by cases. 3. Anonymous posted-price revenue. For independent bidders with laws and a price , the revenue of selling at price to a bidder with value at least is . is its supremum over (an extended real), and an optimal anonymous price is a attaining it. 4. Monopoly reserve. A price maximizing over .
They are used by the strong-regularity results of §4.2.1 and §6.2.3 and by Lemma A.7.
Formalization Note Strong regularity is imposed on the same set as the published Regular, so a zero density at the lowest support point (a null type) is allowed.
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_ValueDist
open MeasureTheory
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
/-- Definition A.2 on the published value laws: on the set where the published
`Regular` asks monotonicity, the virtual value grows at least at slope `α`.
With `α = 0` this is exactly `Regular`; `α = 1` is MHR. -/
def StronglyRegular (α : ℝ) (D : ValueDist) : Prop :=
∀ x y : ℝ, D.lo < x → (y : WithTop ℝ) ≤ D.hi → x ≤ y →
α * (y - x) ≤ virtualValue D y - virtualValue D x
/-- `c_α = α^{1/(1-α)}` for `α < 1` and `c_1 = 1/e`, by cases (no limit). -/
noncomputable def cAlpha (α : ℝ) : ℝ :=
if α < 1 then α ^ (1 / (1 - α)) else Real.exp (-1)
/-- Revenue of the anonymous posted price `p` without an intermediary: the item is
sold at price `p` whenever some bidder has value at least `p`. -/
noncomputable def anonymousPriceRevenue {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
p * ((prior D) {v | ∃ i, p ≤ v i}).toReal
/-- `APRev`: the best anonymous posted-price revenue without an intermediary. -/
noncomputable def APRev {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) : EReal :=
⨆ (p : ℝ) (_ : 0 ≤ p), ((anonymousPriceRevenue D p : ℝ) : EReal)
/-- An optimal anonymous posted price `AP*`: a nonnegative price attaining `APRev`. -/
def IsOptimalAnonymousPrice {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (p : ℝ) : Prop :=
0 ≤ p ∧ ((anonymousPriceRevenue D p : ℝ) : EReal) = APRev D
/-- A monopoly reserve: a nonnegative price maximizing `t · Pr[v ≥ t]` over `t ≥ 0`. -/
def IsMonopolyReserve (D : ValueDist) (r : ℝ) : Prop :=
0 ≤ r ∧ ∀ t : ℝ, 0 ≤ t → t * (D.law (Set.Ici t)).toReal ≤ r * (D.law (Set.Ici r)).toReal
end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement