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α-strong regularity, cαc_\alphacα​, anonymous posted-price revenue and monopoly reserves

Definition
LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_StrongRegularity

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

These definitions extend the published value laws DDD (density on [a,b)[a,b)[a,b), optional terminal atom at a finite bbb, virtual value ϕ(t)=t−S(t)/f(t)\phi(t)=t-S(t)/f(t)ϕ(t)=t−S(t)/f(t) with S(t)=Pr⁡[V>t]S(t)=\Pr[V>t]S(t)=Pr[V>t], and ϕ(b)=b\phi(b)=bϕ(b)=b).

  1. α-strong regularity (Definition A.2). For α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0, DDD is α-strongly regular if
ϕ(y)−ϕ(x)≥α (y−x)for all a<x≤y≤b.\phi(y)-\phi(x)\ge\alpha\,(y-x)\qquad\text{for all } a<x\le y\le b .ϕ(y)−ϕ(x)≥α(y−x)for all a<x≤y≤b.

For α=0\alpha=0α=0 this is exactly the published regularity; α=1\alpha=1α=1 is the monotone hazard rate condition. 2. The constant cα=α1/(1−α)c_\alpha=\alpha^{1/(1-\alpha)}cα​=α1/(1−α) for α<1\alpha<1α<1 and c1=1/ec_1=1/ec1​=1/e, defined by cases. 3. Anonymous posted-price revenue. For independent bidders with laws D1,…,DnD_1,\dots,D_nD1​,…,Dn​ and a price ppp, the revenue of selling at price ppp to a bidder with value at least ppp is pPr⁡[∃i, vi≥p]p\Pr[\exists i,\ v_i\ge p]pPr[∃i, vi​≥p]. APRev\mathrm{APRev}APRev is its supremum over p≥0p\ge0p≥0 (an extended real), and an optimal anonymous price AP∗\mathrm{AP}^*AP∗ is a p≥0p\ge0p≥0 attaining it. 4. Monopoly reserve. A price r≥0r\ge0r≥0 maximizing tPr⁡[v≥t]t\Pr[v\ge t]tPr[v≥t] over t≥0t\ge0t≥0.

They are used by the strong-regularity results of §4.2.1 and §6.2.3 and by Lemma A.7.

Formalization Note Strong regularity is imposed on the same set (a,b](a,b](a,b] as the published Regular, so a zero density at the lowest support point (a null type) is allowed.

Definition code
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_ValueDist

open MeasureTheory

namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- Definition A.2 on the published value laws: on the set where the published
`Regular` asks monotonicity, the virtual value grows at least at slope `α`.
With `α = 0` this is exactly `Regular`; `α = 1` is MHR. -/
def StronglyRegular (α : ℝ) (D : ValueDist) : Prop :=
  ∀ x y : ℝ, D.lo < x → (y : WithTop ℝ) ≤ D.hi → x ≤ y →
    α * (y - x) ≤ virtualValue D y - virtualValue D x

/-- `c_α = α^{1/(1-α)}` for `α < 1` and `c_1 = 1/e`, by cases (no limit). -/
noncomputable def cAlpha (α : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  if α < 1 then α ^ (1 / (1 - α)) else Real.exp (-1)

/-- Revenue of the anonymous posted price `p` without an intermediary: the item is
sold at price `p` whenever some bidder has value at least `p`. -/
noncomputable def anonymousPriceRevenue {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  p * ((prior D) {v | ∃ i, p ≤ v i}).toReal

/-- `APRev`: the best anonymous posted-price revenue without an intermediary. -/
noncomputable def APRev {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) : EReal :=
  ⨆ (p : ℝ) (_ : 0 ≤ p), ((anonymousPriceRevenue D p : ℝ) : EReal)

/-- An optimal anonymous posted price `AP*`: a nonnegative price attaining `APRev`. -/
def IsOptimalAnonymousPrice {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (p : ℝ) : Prop :=
  0 ≤ p ∧ ((anonymousPriceRevenue D p : ℝ) : EReal) = APRev D

/-- A monopoly reserve: a nonnegative price maximizing `t · Pr[v ≥ t]` over `t ≥ 0`. -/
def IsMonopolyReserve (D : ValueDist) (r : ℝ) : Prop :=
  0 ≤ r ∧ ∀ t : ℝ, 0 ≤ t → t * (D.law (Set.Ici t)).toReal ≤ r * (D.law (Set.Ici r)).toReal

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), Definition A.2 and Lemma A.3, p.37 (PDF p.38); §3.1, p.9 (PDF p.10); APRev before Theorem A.10, p.40 (PDF p.41); Lemma A.7, p.39 (PDF p.40); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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