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ALG≥∑jQjALG \ge \sum_j Q_jALG≥∑j​Qj​ for every preallocation

Proved
ComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding.alg_ge_sum_max_clause

by mikedeng1 · Sep 28, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

combinatorial-auctionsp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1xos-valuations

Let every bidder iii have an XOS valuation viv_ivi​ with admissible clause set WiW_iWi​, let cli\mathrm{cl}_icli​ be an XOS oracle for viv_ivi​, and let win\mathrm{win}win be a highest-clause assignment rule. Fix any preallocation σ=(S1,…,Sn)\sigma=(S_1,\dots,S_n)σ=(S1​,…,Sn​), write pi=cli(Si)p^i=\mathrm{cl}_i(S_i)pi=cli​(Si​) and Qj=max⁡ipjiQ_j=\max_{i}p^i_jQj​=maxi​pji​, and let ALG(σ)\mathrm{ALG}(\sigma)ALG(σ) be the welfare of the allocation that gives each item jjj to bidder win(σ,j)\mathrm{win}(\sigma,j)win(σ,j). Then

∑j∈MQj ≤ ALG(σ).\sum_{j\in M} Q_j\ \le\ \mathrm{ALG}(\sigma).j∈M∑​Qj​ ≤ ALG(σ).

The inequality holds pointwise, for every outcome of the rounding step; it reduces the analysis of the algorithm to a lower bound on the expectation of each QjQ_jQj​ separately.

Formalization Note The paper justifies the step by the clause bound ∑j∈Tpj(i,S)≤vi(T)\sum_{j\in T}p^{(i,S)}_j\le v_i(T)∑j∈T​pj(i,S)​≤vi​(T) "for every T⊆ST\subseteq ST⊆S". The bundle a bidder receives need not lie inside its preallocated bundle, so the argument uses the bound for every TTT, which holds because p(i,S)p^{(i,S)}p(i,S) is a clause of viv_ivi​'s expression. At least one bidder (n≥1n\ge1n≥1) is assumed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_XOSRounding_Model
import Definitions.Def_ComplementFreeCA_XOSRounding_Algorithm
Formal statement
namespace ComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding

theorem alg_ge_sum_max_clause {n m : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n)
    (W : Fin n → Finset (Fin m → ℝ)) (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
    (hv : ∀ i, IsXOSWith (v i) (W i))
    (cl : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → Fin m → ℝ) (hcl : ∀ i, IsXOSOracle (v i) (W i) (cl i))
    (win : (Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) → Fin m → Fin n) (hwin : IsHighestClauseRule cl win)
    (σ : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) :
    ∑ j, maxClauseEntry hn cl σ j ≤ algWelfare v win σ := by sorry

end ComplementFreeCA.XOSRounding
Source
Dobzinski, Nisan, Schapira, Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders, Math. Oper. Res. 35(1), 2010, p. 7, §3.2, proof of Theorem 3.2, paragraph after the first display (ALG ≥ Σ_j Q_j)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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