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Theorem 15.3: VVV is bidder-submodular iff the core of every coalition is ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ iff the VCG vector of every coalition lies in its core

Proved
SupplyChainTheory.vcg_core_characterization

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionscooperative-gamescoreoperations-researchsubmodularityvcg

Theorem 15.3. For a coalitional value function VVV, the following three statements are equivalent:

(i) VVV is bidder-submodular: for every bidder kkk and coalitions 0∈S⊆S′0 \in S \subseteq S'0∈S⊆S′, V(S∪k)−V(S)≥V(S′∪k)−V(S′)V(S \cup k) - V(S) \ge V(S' \cup k) - V(S')V(S∪k)−V(S)≥V(S′∪k)−V(S′);

(ii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0, C(S,V)=ΠSC(S, V) = \Pi_SC(S,V)=ΠS​, where ΠS={π:∑k∈Sπk=V(S), 0≤πk≤πˉk(S) ∀k∈S∖0}\Pi_S = \{\pi : \sum_{k \in S}\pi_k = V(S),\ 0 \le \pi_k \le \bar\pi_k(S)\ \forall k \in S \setminus 0\}ΠS​={π:∑k∈S​πk​=V(S), 0≤πk​≤πˉk​(S) ∀k∈S∖0};

(iii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0, the VCG payoff vector πˉ(S)\bar\pi(S)πˉ(S) lies in C(S,V)C(S, V)C(S,V).

Bidder-submodularity is thus exactly the condition under which the VCG auction's payoff vector is a competitive outcome whatever the set of participating bidders, so that the revenue deficiency, non-monotonicity, collusion and false-name defects of Sect. 15.4.2 cannot occur. The book's proof shows (i) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (ii) by telescoping the marginal contributions along a chain of coalitions, (ii) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (iii) since πˉ(S)∈ΠS\bar\pi(S) \in \Pi_Sπˉ(S)∈ΠS​, and (iii) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (i) by exhibiting, from a failure of submodularity, a coalition that blocks its own VCG vector.

Formalization Note The statement is the conjunction (i) ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ (ii) and (i) ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ (iii); payoff vectors are functions on all players, and the conditions defining the core and ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ involve only the players of SSS.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_auctions
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory

theorem vcg_core_characterization {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ)
    (hV : IsCoalitionalValue V) :
    (BidderSubmodular V ↔ ∀ S : Finset (Fin (n + 1)), (0 : Fin (n + 1)) ∈ S → ∀ π,
        InCore V S π ↔ (∑ k ∈ S, π k = V S ∧ ∀ k ∈ S, k ≠ 0 → 0 ≤ π k ∧ π k ≤ vcgPayoff V S k))
      ∧ (BidderSubmodular V ↔ ∀ S : Finset (Fin (n + 1)), (0 : Fin (n + 1)) ∈ S →
          InCore V S (vcgPayoff V S)) := by sorry

end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, pp. 607-608, Sect. 15.4.3, Theorem 15.3 and its proof; after Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by naimengye · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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