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Lemma 4.5 — tree sizes after Rounding (a), and goods of price above 111

Proved
SatiationFisherNSW.lemma_4_5

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

approximation-algorithmsfisher-marketmarket-equilibriumnash-social-welfarep2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Under the standing assumptions of §4.1, consider any run of the rounding procedure and a tree component TTT of (B∖B0)×(G∖G0)(B\setminus B_0)\times(G\setminus G_0)(B∖B0​)×(G∖G0​) after step (a) of rounding. Then TTT has kT+1k_T+1kT​+1 agents and kTk_TkT​ goods for some kT≥0k_T\ge0kT​≥0.

Moreover, suppose agent iii of TTT is assigned a good jjj with pj>1p_j>1pj​>1 during step (a) of rounding. Then

  1. iii spends all its money on jjj: pjxij=1p_jx_{ij}=1pj​xij​=1;
  2. iii is the only agent that spends money on jjj: pjxi′j=0p_jx_{i'j}=0pj​xi′j​=0 for i′≠ii'\neq ii′=i;
  3. the valuation of iii after rounding is exactly pjp_jpj​;
  4. Bc∩T=∅B_c\cap T=\emptysetBc​∩T=∅: no agent of TTT is capped in (x,p)(x,p)(x,p).

Differences from the source:

  • reading: a demand bundle maximizes ui(xi)u_i(\mathbf x_i)ui​(xi​) over bundles with ∑jpjxij≤mi\sum_j p_jx_{ij}\le m_i∑j​pj​xij​≤mi​, bundles having xij∈[0,1]x_{ij}\in[0,1]xij​∈[0,1] (p.6) → the maximum is taken over all y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 with ∑jpjyj≤mi\sum_j p_jy_j\le m_i∑j​pj​yj​≤mi​, without the box yj≤1y_j\le 1yj​≤1; reason: with the box Lemma 4.3(a) fails (one agent, one item, v=1v=1v=1, c=5c=5c=5, p=1/2p=1/2p=1/2, x=1x=1x=1 would be an equilibrium in which the uncapped agent spends 1/21/21/2); the paper computes the maximal utility as min⁡{ci,miαi}\min\{c_i,m_i\alpha_i\}min{ci​,mi​αi​} (proof of Lemma 3.5, p.14), the unboxed maximum; unit supply is enforced by xj≤ejx_j\le e_jxj​≤ej​
  • reading: an allocation has ∑ixij=1\sum_{i}x_{ij}=1∑i​xij​=1 for every good (p.6) → only ∑ixij≤ej\sum_i x_{ij}\le e_j∑i​xij​≤ej​ (Definition 2.1 (3)); reason: Definition 2.1 (3) and (5) force xj=ej<1x_j=e_j<1xj​=ej​<1 when pj>djp_j>d_jpj​>dj​, and Proposition 3.1 (Property 1) has x11=1/2x_{11}=1/2x11​=1/2
  • encoding: jjj is an MBB good of iii if uij/pj=αiu_{ij}/p_j=\alpha_iuij​/pj​=αi​, with αi=∞\alpha_i=\inftyαi​=∞ for buyers interested in a zero-price good and 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 (p.6) → uij>0u_{ij}>0uij​>0 and uikpj≤uijpku_{ik}p_j\le u_{ij}p_kuik​pj​≤uij​pk​ for all kkk; reason: no ∞\infty∞ in R\mathbb RR; the same MBB goods for every buyer with some positive value; it differs only for a buyer whose values are all 000, who then buys nothing (such a buyer violates money clearing, and in the goal makes every product 000)
  • encoding: modest supply ej=min⁡(1,dj/pj)e_j=\min(1,d_j/p_j)ej​=min(1,dj​/pj​) (p.6) → ej=1e_j=1ej​=1 when pj=0p_j=0pj​=0, else min⁡(1,dj/pj)\min(1,d_j/p_j)min(1,dj​/pj​); reason: at pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 the paper's dj/pjd_j/p_jdj​/pj​ is +∞+\infty+∞, while Lean's dj/0d_j/0dj​/0 is 000
  • encoding: "we normalize vij′=vij/αiv'_{ij}=v_{ij}/\alpha_ivij′​=vij​/αi​ and ci′=ci/αic'_i=c_i/\alpha_ici′​=ci​/αi​" for i∈B∖B0i\in B\setminus B_0i∈B∖B0​ and "assume that vvv and ccc fulfill these conditions directly" (p.24) → hypothesis IsNormalized: every buyer outside B0B_0B0​ has MBB ratio αi=max⁡kuik/pk=1\alpha_i=\max_k u_{ik}/p_k=1αi​=maxk​uik​/pk​=1; reason: the paper's own convention; every normalized instance arises this way and the rescaling preserves money clearing, v≤cv\le cv≤c and the equilibrium
  • encoding: the procedure of §4.1.2 (pp.26–27) and Appendix B (pp.33–34), with arbitrary root choice and tie-breaks, run recursively → a relation RoundingRun.IsValid on the choices (an orientation of the allocation forest from root agents, a largest child per good, a greedy pick per agent), the kept child forced by the threshold, and the output defined from the recursion path; reason: the choices are exactly those the paper leaves free, and every valid run is covered; the recursion of Rounding (b) assigns the picked goods along the path to their parents and every other remaining good to its child agent
  • reading: "each tree component TTT" after step (a) of rounding → the tree components of the forest after preprocessing that contain an agent, with kTk_TkT​ the number of their goods that kept a child (the goods left after step (a)); reason: the goods assigned in step (a) are leaves, so removing them changes no component's agents; components without an agent are single unsold zero-price goods, which the procedure never roots
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SatiationFisherNSW_NSWInstance
import Definitions.Def_SatiationFisherNSW_RoundingRun
open scoped Classical
Formal statement
namespace SatiationFisherNSW

/-- Lemma 4.5 (Garg, Hoefer, Mehlhorn, arXiv:1707.04428v3, p.27): after step (a) of rounding,
each tree component `T` has `k_T + 1` agents and `k_T` goods for some `k_T ≥ 0`. Suppose agent
`i` in `T` is assigned a good `j` with `p_j > 1` during step (a) of rounding. Then `i` spends all
its money on `j`, and `i` is the only agent that spends money on `j`. Moreover, the valuation of
`i` after rounding is `p_j`, and `B_c ∩ T = ∅`.

**Formalization Note** `T` ranges over the tree components of the forest after preprocessing
whose agents lie outside `B₀` (`IsPriceTree`); its goods at the end of Rounding (a) are
`remainingGoodsOf T` (the goods assigned in step (a) are leaves and do not affect the agents of
a component). "Assigned during step (a)" means: `j`'s parent agent is `i` and `j` kept no child.
"Spends all its money" is `p_j x_{ij} = m_i = 1`; "the only agent that spends money on `j`" is
`p_j x_{i'j} = 0` for `i' ≠ i`. The valuation after rounding is `v_i` of the output allocation,
and `B_c` is the set of capped buyers in `(x, p)`.
The standing assumptions of §4.1 are hypotheses: `v_{ij} ≤ c_i`
(p.23, "Henceforth"), the market of the instance (`u = v`, `m_i = d_j = 1`) is money clearing
(p.24, "for the remainder of this section"), `(x, p)` is a thrifty and modest equilibrium of it,
and the valuations are normalized according to `p` (MBB ratio `1` for every buyer outside `B₀`,
p.24).
A run of the procedure is any valid choice of roots, largest children and picks
(`RoundingRun.IsValid`); the statement holds for every run. -/
theorem lemma_4_5
    {B G : Type*} [Fintype B] [Fintype G] (I : NSWInstance B G)
    (hvc : ∀ i j, I.v i j ≤ I.c i) (hMC : I.market.IsMoneyClearing)
    (x : B → G → ℝ) (p : G → ℝ) (hEq : I.market.IsEquilibrium x p) (hN : I.IsNormalized p)
    (R : RoundingRun B G) (hR : R.IsValid I.market x p)
    (T : (R.ppGraph I.market x p).ConnectedComponent) (hT : R.IsPriceTree I.market x p T) :
    (R.agentsOf I.market x p T).card = (R.remainingGoodsOf I.market x p T).card + 1 ∧
    ∀ i ∈ R.agentsOf I.market x p T, ∀ j, R.parentAgent j = some i →
      R.keptChild I.market x p j = none → 1 < p j →
        p j * x i j = 1 ∧ (∀ i', i' ≠ i → p j * x i' j = 0) ∧
        I.val i (R.output I.market x p) = p j ∧
        ∀ a ∈ R.agentsOf I.market x p T, ¬ I.market.IsCapped x a := by sorry

end SatiationFisherNSW
Source
Garg, Hoefer, Mehlhorn, Satiation in Fisher markets and approximation of Nash social welfare, arXiv:1707.04428v3 (31 Jul 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.04428v3, Lemma 4.5, p.27; procedure, pp.26–27
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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