Theorem 2(ii) — countably additive correlated equilibrium for continuous payoffs
ProvedHartSchmeidler.FinStrat.theorem_2_iiLet be any nonempty set of players, with no finiteness or countability restriction on . Every player has a nonempty finite set of pure strategies, equipped with the discrete topology, and a continuous payoff . Then there is a countably additive probability measure on the product σ-algebra such that, for every and , the payoff difference is integrable on and
Thus a correlated recommendation scheme exists even with arbitrarily many players, provided each strategy set is finite and payoffs are continuous.
Formalization Note. The product measurable structure is ; it can be strictly smaller than the Borel σ-algebra when the player set is uncountable. The unilateral deviation replaces only coordinate . Continuity on the compact product supplies the boundedness and measurability assumed in §3, while integrability is made explicit to exclude Lean's default zero integral for nonintegrable functions.
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_FinStrat_Game
namespace HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
open MeasureTheory
/-- Hart and Schmeidler (1989), Theorem 2(ii), p. 21. -/
theorem theorem_2_ii {ι : Type*} [Nonempty ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
[∀ i, TopologicalSpace (S i)] [∀ i, DiscreteTopology (S i)]
[∀ i, MeasurableSpace (S i)] [∀ i, DiscreteMeasurableSpace (S i)]
(h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (hh : ∀ i, Continuous (h i)) :
∃ μ : Measure (∀ i, S i), IsCorrelatedEq h μ := by sorry
end HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.