(C.4), p. 48 — H-market clearing gives μ_H K = I_H − A = (pR − f̄_H)A/(R̄_H − (pR − f̄_H))
ProvedPELiquidity.Primary.fund_sizeequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1private-equity
In an equilibrium with , suppose only H-funds are raised and their return exceeds the H-LPs' break-even rate. Write for the expected fee of the optimal H-fund contract and for its pledgeable income. Then , and H-LPs supply all their capital. Market clearing and (3) give the full equation (C.4):
For a fixed fee, the right-hand side is strictly decreasing as the promised return rises above .
Formalization Note The equilibrium predicate supplies the capital-market and optimal-contract conditions; the theorem makes the market-clearing equality explicit.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PELiquidity_Primary_Setting import Definitions.Def_PELiquidity_Primary_Market
Formal statement
namespace PELiquidity.Primary
/-- (C.4), Case 2 of Proposition 2: when only H-funds are raised and their
return exceeds H-LPs' break-even return, the H capital supply is `μ_H K`.
Market clearing and (3) give `μ_H K = I_H - A = (pR - f̄_H) A /
(R̄_H - (pR - f̄_H))`. For a fixed fee the contribution falls strictly as
the promised return rises. -/
theorem fund_size (P : Params) (muH : ℝ) (E : Allocation)
(hmu0 : 0 < muH) (hmu1 : muH < 1) (hE : IsEquilibrium P muH E)
(hαL : E.αL = 0) (hRH : grossReturn P.lam P.δH < E.RH) :
let pledge := P.p * P.R - expectedFee P.p P.p E.fH
0 < pledge ∧ pledge < E.RH ∧
muH * P.K = E.IH - P.A ∧
E.IH - P.A = pledge * P.A / (E.RH - pledge) ∧
StrictAntiOn (fun Rb : ℝ => pledge * P.A / (Rb - pledge))
(Set.Ioi pledge) := by sorry
end PELiquidity.Primary
Source
Maurin, Robinson & Strömberg, A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity, working paper (draft of December 2020), p. 48, Appendix C.3, proof of Proposition 2, Case 2, (C.4)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.