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Corollary 1 (i), p. 13 — there is θ̃ ∈ (0, 1] with α* = α̲ for θb ≤ θ̃ and α* = ᾱ for θb > θ̃

Proved
InfoBargaining.Uniform.corollary1_i_threshold_theta

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargaininginformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1thresholduniform-prior

Under the uniform prior and the linear information cost, fix the seller's cost c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1) and let θ~=kˉ/[A(αˉ,c)−A(α‾,c)]\tilde\theta=\bar k/[A(\bar\alpha,c)-A(\underline\alpha,c)]θ~=kˉ/[A(αˉ,c)−A(α​,c)] when this gain exceeds kˉ\bar kkˉ, and θ~=1\tilde\theta=1θ~=1 otherwise. Then θ~∈(0,1]\tilde\theta\in(0,1]θ~∈(0,1] and, for every buyer bargaining power θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1), with α∗\alpha^*α∗ the set of optimal information levels:

  1. if θb≤θ~\theta_b\le\tilde\thetaθb​≤θ~, minimal information is optimal: α‾∈α∗\underline\alpha\in\alpha^*α​∈α∗;
  2. if θb<θ~\theta_b<\tilde\thetaθb​<θ~, it is the only optimum: α∗={α‾}\alpha^*=\{\underline\alpha\}α∗={α​};
  3. if θb>θ~\theta_b>\tilde\thetaθb​>θ~, maximal information is the only optimum: α∗={αˉ}\alpha^*=\{\bar\alpha\}α∗={αˉ}.

In words, the buyer acquires information only when its bargaining power is high enough to recover the information cost from its share of the surplus. The jump of α∗\alpha^*α∗ at θb=θ~\theta_b=\tilde\thetaθb​=θ~ drives the jump in the seller's payoff in Proposition 2 (i).

Formalization Note The paper's "α∗=α‾\alpha^*=\underline\alphaα∗=α​ for θb≤θ~\theta_b\le\tilde\thetaθb​≤θ~" is items 1 and 2: at θb=θ~<1\theta_b=\tilde\theta<1θb​=θ~<1 both corners are optimal and the paper selects α‾\underline\alphaα​. Restricted to the uniform prior; the paper states the corollary for four priors but works out only this one.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform

theorem corollary1_i_threshold_theta (M : Model) (c : ℝ) (hc : c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
    0 < M.thetaTilde c ∧ M.thetaTilde c ≤ 1 ∧
    ∀ θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1,
      (θb ≤ M.thetaTilde c → M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
      (θb < M.thetaTilde c → M.optSet θb c = {M.αlo}) ∧
      (M.thetaTilde c < θb → M.optSet θb c = {M.αhi}) := by sorry

end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 13, Corollary 1 (i); θ̃ from p. 30, proof of Corollary 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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