Corollary 1 (i), p. 13 — there is θ̃ ∈ (0, 1] with α* = α̲ for θb ≤ θ̃ and α* = ᾱ for θb > θ̃
ProvedInfoBargaining.Uniform.corollary1_i_threshold_thetabargaininginformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1thresholduniform-prior
Under the uniform prior and the linear information cost, fix the seller's cost and let when this gain exceeds , and otherwise. Then and, for every buyer bargaining power , with the set of optimal information levels:
- if , minimal information is optimal: ;
- if , it is the only optimum: ;
- if , maximal information is the only optimum: .
In words, the buyer acquires information only when its bargaining power is high enough to recover the information cost from its share of the surplus. The jump of at drives the jump in the seller's payoff in Proposition 2 (i).
Formalization Note The paper's " for " is items 1 and 2: at both corners are optimal and the paper selects . Restricted to the uniform prior; the paper states the corollary for four priors but works out only this one.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform
theorem corollary1_i_threshold_theta (M : Model) (c : ℝ) (hc : c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
0 < M.thetaTilde c ∧ M.thetaTilde c ≤ 1 ∧
∀ θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1,
(θb ≤ M.thetaTilde c → M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
(θb < M.thetaTilde c → M.optSet θb c = {M.αlo}) ∧
(M.thetaTilde c < θb → M.optSet θb c = {M.αhi}) := by sorry
end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 13, Corollary 1 (i); θ̃ from p. 30, proof of Corollary 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.