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Proposition 8.2 -- dominant strategy incentive compatibility implies monotonicity

Proved
MechanismDesign.SocialChoice.dsic_monotone

by mikedeng1 · Oct 3, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

mechanism-designp2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness

Let III be a finite set of agents, AAA a finite set of alternatives, and f:RN→Af:\mathcal R^N\to Af:RN→A a direct mechanism on profiles of linear orders. If fff is dominant strategy incentive-compatible, that is, f(Ri,R−i) Ri f(Ri′,R−i)f(R_i,R_{-i})\,R_i\,f(R_i',R_{-i})f(Ri​,R−i​)Ri​f(Ri′​,R−i​) for all iii, RRR, Ri′R_i'Ri′​, then fff is monotone in the sense of Maskin:

f(R)=a  and  ∀i ∀b (a Ri b⇒a Ri′ b)⟹f(R′)=a.f(R)=a\ \text{ and }\ \forall i\ \forall b\ \big(a\,R_i\,b\Rightarrow a\,R_i'\,b\big)\quad\Longrightarrow\quad f(R')=a.f(R)=a  and  ∀i ∀b (aRi​b⇒aRi′​b)⟹f(R′)=a.

This is the first step of the book's proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: it reduces strategy-proofness to the weaker, purely ordinal condition of monotonicity.

Formalization Note Monotonicity here is the book's Definition 8.4, which compares arbitrary profiles RRR and R′R'R′ (all agents may change at once); it is not the one-agent deviation property of other texts.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_SocialChoice_Model
Formal statement
namespace MechanismDesign.SocialChoice

/-- **Proposition 8.2** (Börgers, p.144): if `f` is dominant strategy incentive-compatible, then
it is monotone. -/
theorem dsic_monotone {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Fintype A]
    (f : DirectMechanism ι A) (hf : IsDSIC f) : IsMonotone f := by sorry

end MechanismDesign.SocialChoice
Source
Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001, p.144, Proposition 8.2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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