Appendix, p. 29 — case 2 has no separating equilibrium
ProvedCustomerVoice.ONoOther.low_case_no_equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1separating-equilibriumsignaling
In the two-type O-Learning customization model with its standing assumptions, suppose
Then no pair of distinct nonnegative requests, under any on-path-consistent belief function, forms a separating pure-strategy equilibrium. This is the Appendix's second failure case, covering both possible orders of the two requests.
Formalization Note The conditional buyer payoff retains both terms of equation (9); the equilibrium compares the actual payoff after seller acceptance or rejection.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CustomerVoice_ONoOther_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CustomerVoice.ONoOther
theorem low_case_no_equilibrium (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing)
(hr : M.θH / M.θL < M.LambdaL) :
¬ ∃ (req : CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType → ℝ) (bel : ℝ → CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType), M.OSepEq req bel := by sorry
end CustomerVoice.ONoOther
Source
Guo, The Voice of Customers in Customization, SSRN working paper 3994319 (version of 2023-11-29, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3994319), p. 29, Appendix, No Other Separating Equilibrium under the O-Learning Customization
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.