Proposition 4.4, p. 17 — vendor welfare:
ProvedPermBlockchain.Failure.proposition_4_4blockchainp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1vendor-welfare
Consider the reduced-form blockchain supply chain under its standing assumptions, with for some , and suppose Assumption 1 holds at . The vendor welfare
in the three scenarios satisfies
Adoption reveals the low type goods, whose manufacturers cut the price they pay the low type vendor; the vendors lose from adoption.
Formalization Note Prices and shares are Proposition A.1's closed forms, with , which is below as on p. 28. No second derivative of is assumed (the printed proof uses ; the statement does not need it).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_PermBlockchain_Failure_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PermBlockchain.Failure
/-- **Proposition 4.4** (p. 17): vendor welfare satisfies `W^F_V, W^P_V < W^N_V`. -/
theorem proposition_4_4 {m : ℕ} (M : Model m) (hM : M.Standing) (Δ : ℝ) (hΔ : 0 < Δ)
(hA : M.Assumption1 Δ) :
M.WV .F Δ < M.WV .N Δ ∧ M.WV .P Δ < M.WV .N Δ := by sorry
end PermBlockchain.Failure
Source
Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman, Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376 (version of 2022-08-19), p. 17, Proposition 4.4
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.