§3.1, Eq. (8): uniform expected shortfall and the retailer's rebate profit
ProvedFalseFailureReturns.TargetRebate.uniform_rebate_profitcontractsp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Let and , and let . For a target with ,
and consequently, for every rebate , the retailer's expected profit (6) under the contract is
This closed form is what the first-order condition (9) and the appendix computations work with.
Formalization Note The paper prints , with a stray factor ; the expectation is and times it is , as stated here. The range is where the closed form holds (the paper's requirement on p. 383).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FalseFailureReturns_TargetRebate_Model import Definitions.Def_FalseFailureReturns_TargetRebate_UniformRebate
Formal statement
namespace FalseFailureReturns.TargetRebate
theorem uniform_rebate_profit (P : Params) (T u ρ : ℝ)
(hβ : 0 < P.β) (hρ : 0 < ρ) (hT0 : 0 ≤ T) (hT : T ≤ 2 * P.β / ρ) :
expShortfall P.β ρ T = T ^ 2 * ρ / (4 * P.β) ∧
rebateRetailerProfit P T u ρ =
T ^ 2 * u * ρ / (4 * P.β) - P.a * ρ ^ 2 / 2 + P.Rr * P.β * (1 - 1 / ρ) := by sorry
end FalseFailureReturns.TargetRebate
Source
Ferguson, Guide & Souza, Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns, MSOM 8(4) 2006, p. 383, §3.1, Eq. (8)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.