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Theorem 6 — the signed CHK compiler is in Secad(q)\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(q)Secad(q)

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RestrictedDec.Supplement.theorem_6

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

Let MMM be a common message space and qqq a public observation with Validq\mathrm{Valid}_qValidq​ and Repq\mathrm{Rep}_qRepq​. Assume

  1. RRR is an efficient, IND-CPA-secure, ordinarily correct residual scheme over MMM;
  2. SSS is an efficient, correct, strongly unforgeable one-time signature (Definitions 13, 14);
  3. III is an efficient, selective-identity IND-CPA-secure, ordinarily correct IBE whose efficiently recognizable identity space contains every verification key output by SGen\mathrm{SGen}SGen and whose message space contains every valid label;
  4. PPP is an efficient secure PRF on the identity space with outputs of the extraction-tape length (stable extraction).

Then the signed construction (4.3) satisfies INDFqad\mathrm{IND}^{ad}_{\mathcal F_q}INDFq​ad​ security, with ordinary correctness:

Signedq∈Secad(q).\mathrm{Signed}_q\in\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(q).Signedq​∈Secad(q).

The compiler protects only the public observation q(m)q(m)q(m); it reaches adaptive qqq-security from CPA-level components, which is the intermediate security class the paper constructs.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: keys, messages, ciphertexts, labels, M_⊥, coins, PPT adversaries and reductions → bit strings with tuple codes, Option Str (none = ⊥), explicit uniform coin vectors, uniform reactive machines with a polynomial-time step function (RestrictedDec.Adversary); reason: the model of the published base mission; same instances
  • encoding: Sec^t(q) = Sec^t(F_q), F_q = {g ∘ q : g an admissible circuit / efficient public postprocessing} → SecM t M (famObs q); reason: the published famObs is the class of §2.3, p.14
  • encoding: PPT primitives (R, L, I, P, S, N, q, samplers) → separate efficiency hypotheses (IsSchemeM, IsEfficient, IsPublic, IsObsMap); reason: the paper's PPT convention; the reductions run these algorithms
  • reading: IBE extraction is stable per identity, using a secure PRF → the compiler derives the extraction tape PRF_k(id) with k in the secret key; P is a secure PRF on the identity space with outputs of length r_ext(λ); reason: §4.2, p.24 and Lemma 2, p.31
  • reading: identities include the identities the compiler uses; the IBE message space contains every valid q-label → hypotheses on the identity space Id and the message space Ym of I; reason: §4.2, p.24 ('Its identities include a canonical, injective encoding of one-time verification keys; its message space contains every valid q-label')
  • reading: a public identity space I_λ; malformed encodings are rejected → Id is efficiently recognizable and a ciphertext whose identity is outside Id_λ is malformed (⊥); reason: App. A.3, p.31 ('a public identity space Iλ'); decryption 'Reject malformed encodings', p.25; without the test the IBE and PRF reductions could not answer queries on identities outside I_λ
  • encoding: ciphertext tuples and malformed encodings → canonical tuple codes; malformed = not the code of a tuple of the right length; reason: an unambiguous canonical encoding, p.24
  • reading: Theorem 6's list of assumptions → adds correctness of the one-time signature (Definition 14); reason: the theorem takes ordinary correctness from Lemma 1, p.25, which assumes 'correctness of the one-time signature'
  • encoding: the common message space → hypothesis MsgSpace.Found M; reason: standing assumption of §2.1, p.13
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_famObs
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_MsgSpace
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_IsSchemeM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_INDCPAM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_signedCHK
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

/-- **Theorem 6** (the signed CHK compiler is adaptively `q`-secure). Let `M` be a common message
space and `q` a public observation with `Valid_q`, `Rep_q`. Let `R` be an efficient, IND-CPA-secure,
ordinarily correct residual scheme over `M`; `S` an efficient, correct, strongly unforgeable
one-time signature; `I` an efficient, selective-identity IND-CPA-secure, ordinarily correct IBE
whose identity space contains every verification key output by `SGen` and whose message space
contains every valid label; and `P` an efficient secure PRF on the identity space with outputs of
the extraction-coin length. Then the signed construction (4.3) is in `Sec^ad(q)`, with ordinary
correctness.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 6, p.26; construction
(4.3), pp.24–25; Lemma 1, p.25; Definitions 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14. -/
theorem theorem_6 (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (hM : MsgSpace.Found M) (o : Obs) (ho : o.IsPublic M)
    (R : PKE) (hR : IsSchemeM M R) (hRcpa : INDCPAM M R) (hRcor : CorrectM M R)
    (S : OTS) (hS : S.IsEfficient) (hSsuf : S.SUF) (hScor : S.Correct)
    (I : IBE) (Id Ym : ℕ → Str → Prop) (hI : I.IsEfficient)
    (hIdrec : Recognizable Id)
    (hId : ∀ (lam : ℕ) (r : Fin (S.keyCoins lam) → Bool), Id lam (S.gen lam r).2)
    (hYm : ∀ (lam : ℕ) (y : Str), o.valid lam y = true → Ym lam y)
    (hIsec : I.SelINDCPA Id Ym) (hIcor : I.Correct Id Ym)
    (P : PRF) (hPlen : ∀ lam, P.outLen lam = I.extCoins lam) (hP : P.IsEfficient Id)
    (hPsec : P.Secure Id) :
    SecM .ad M (famObs o.q) (signedCHK M Id o R I P S) := by sorry

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 6, p.26; (4.3), pp.24–25; Lemma 1, p.25

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