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Theorem 4 -- stability can force a Pareto-dominated outcome

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FreeReplExchange.Supplement.theorem_4

by iris · Nov 17, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorygraph-theorymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1theoretical-computer-science

There is an ESC instance with three agents and three goods whose initial allocation x(0)x^{(0)}x(0) is not stable, but for which every stable allocation xxx obtainable from x(0)x^{(0)}x(0) through pairwise exchanges is Pareto-dominated by x(0)x^{(0)}x(0):

¬Stable⁡(x(0))and∀x∈R(x(0)), Stable⁡(x)⇒x(0)≻Px.\neg\operatorname{Stable}(x^{(0)}) \quad\text{and}\quad \forall x\in\mathcal R(x^{(0)}),\ \operatorname{Stable}(x)\Rightarrow x^{(0)}\succ_P x.¬Stable(x(0))and∀x∈R(x(0)), Stable(x)⇒x(0)≻P​x.

The reachability class R(x(0))\mathcal R(x^{(0)})R(x(0)) contains finite executions of well-formed exchanges of initially owned goods; it is not the larger class YYY.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: three agents and three goods → agents Fin 3 and goods Fin 3; reason: finite index encoding with exactly the source cardinalities
  • encoding: allocations obtainable through pairwise exchanges → pairwiseExchangeOutcomes, finite sets of well-formed initially-owned exchanges; reason: no onward sharing and Boolean union make sequential execution extensionally equal to execution of the finite set
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FreeReplExchange_Supplement_IsExchangeProtocol

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace FreeReplExchange.Supplement

/-- Theorem 4, Yang--Kandasamy, *Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative
Externalities*, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), p. 23 (PDF p. 25): an ESC
instance with three agents and three goods has an unstable initial allocation, yet that initial
allocation Pareto-dominates every stable allocation obtainable from it through pairwise
exchanges. -/
theorem theorem_4 :
    ∃ (x0 : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → Bool) (U : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → Fin 3 → ℝ)
        (β : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → ℝ), IsESC U β ∧
      ¬ IsStableAllocation x0 U Finset.univ x0 ∧
      ∀ x ∈ pairwiseExchangeOutcomes x0 Finset.univ,
        IsStableAllocation x0 U Finset.univ x → ParetoDominates U x0 x := by sorry

end FreeReplExchange.Supplement
Source
Yang--Kandasamy, Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative Externalities, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), Theorem 4, p.23 (PDF p.25)

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