Theorem 4 -- stability can force a Pareto-dominated outcome
OpenFreeReplExchange.Supplement.theorem_4algorithmic-game-theorygraph-theorymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1theoretical-computer-science
There is an ESC instance with three agents and three goods whose initial allocation is not stable, but for which every stable allocation obtainable from through pairwise exchanges is Pareto-dominated by :
The reachability class contains finite executions of well-formed exchanges of initially owned goods; it is not the larger class .
Differences from the source:
- encoding: three agents and three goods → agents
Fin 3and goodsFin 3; reason: finite index encoding with exactly the source cardinalities - encoding: allocations obtainable through pairwise exchanges →
pairwiseExchangeOutcomes, finite sets of well-formed initially-owned exchanges; reason: no onward sharing and Boolean union make sequential execution extensionally equal to execution of the finite set
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FreeReplExchange_Supplement_IsExchangeProtocol set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace FreeReplExchange.Supplement
/-- Theorem 4, Yang--Kandasamy, *Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative
Externalities*, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), p. 23 (PDF p. 25): an ESC
instance with three agents and three goods has an unstable initial allocation, yet that initial
allocation Pareto-dominates every stable allocation obtainable from it through pairwise
exchanges. -/
theorem theorem_4 :
∃ (x0 : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → Bool) (U : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → Fin 3 → ℝ)
(β : Fin 3 → Fin 3 → ℝ), IsESC U β ∧
¬ IsStableAllocation x0 U Finset.univ x0 ∧
∀ x ∈ pairwiseExchangeOutcomes x0 Finset.univ,
IsStableAllocation x0 U Finset.univ x → ParetoDominates U x0 x := by sorry
end FreeReplExchange.Supplement
Source
Yang--Kandasamy, Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative Externalities, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), Theorem 4, p.23 (PDF p.25)