Lemma 6 — atomless -approximate equilibria:
ProvedLargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.lemma_6bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchy
Fix and . There is a constant , depending only on and , such that the following holds. Take any sequence of -unit first-price auctions with agents satisfying Assumption 1, and any sequence of -approximate Bayes–Nash equilibria satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4, with . Then
This is part (b) of the main theorem for atomless equilibria. The paper's proof gives , with the constant of Theorem 1.
Formalization Note is chosen after and before the sequence and . A depending on would make the bound vacuous.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
- encoding: a sequence of k-unit auctions (A^(k))_{k∈ℕ} with n(k) > k agents; subsequences (A^(k_l)) → n : ℕ → ℕ with k < n k, agents Fin (n k), value laws V k and kernels E k indexed by the unit count k (k = 0 included); a subsequence is a strictly increasing φ : ℕ → ℕ and the auction φ l has φ l units; reason: Lean indexing; the term k = 0 does not affect any limit
- reading: Assumption 1(a): every value is at most H almost surely (values are non-negative in the model; 1(b) is stated on [0, H]) → V_i([0, H]) = 1 together with the density bound of 1(b), and 0 < H, 0 < κ; reason: the paper's values are non-negative (its bound O(A^(k)) ≥ kζ and W ≥ 0 use it, and p. 6 fixes H > 0, κ > 0); under Assumption 3 alone non-negativity is not implied, so it is read into Assumption 1
- reading: E_{b∼E_{i,v}}[u_i(v, b)] ≥ sup_{b≥0} u_i(v, b) − ϵ for every v ∈ supp(V_i) → for every v ∈ supp(V_i): b ↦ u_i(v, b) is E_{i,v}-integrable and u_i(v, b) − ϵ ≤ ∫ u_i(v, ·) dE_{i,v} for every b ≥ 0; reason: the ∀ b form is equivalent to the sup form; integrability makes explicit that the paper's expectation is finite (it holds automatically when bids are bounded on the support, as under Assumptions 2 and 3)
- encoding: Let ϵ := lim_{k→∞} ϵ^(k) → a hypothesis Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 ε); reason: the limit is assumed to exist
- reading: ζ′ > 0 is a constant that depends on the parameters of the environment → ∃ ζ′ > 0 quantified after H, κ and before the sequence, n(·) and ϵ*; reason: p. 6 names H and κ as the parameters; the proof's ζ′ = (2 + log(4/3))/ζ depends on them only
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
theorem lemma_6 (H κ : ℝ) (hH : 0 < H) (hκ : 0 < κ) :
∃ ζ' : ℝ, 0 < ζ' ∧
∀ (n : ℕ → ℕ) (V : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Measure ℝ) (E : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Kernel ℝ ℝ)
(εs : ℕ → ℝ) (εstar : ℝ),
IsAuctionSequence n V E →
(∀ k, Assumption1 H κ (V k)) →
(∀ k, IsApproxBNE k (V k) (E k) (εs k)) →
Assumption3 n V E →
(∀ k, IsAtomless (V k) (E k)) →
Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 εstar) →
εstar ∈ Set.Ioo 0 H →
1 - ζ' * εstar * (1 + Real.log (H / εstar)) ≤
Filter.liminf (fun k => welfareRatio k (V k) (E k)) atTop := by sorry
end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 25, Lemma 6 (proof pp. 25–28)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.