Eq. (12), p. 3188 — the licensee's effort is ρ/(2 − ρ)·[(1 − α)e_C − s] if s < (1 − α)e_C, else 0
ProvedBrandLicensing.Intensive.eq_12_licensee_effortbest-responsebrand-licensingmoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Under the standing assumptions, fix a core effort and a royalty . An effort maximizes the licensee's profit (10) over if and only if
So the licensee's best response is unique: it is the solution of the first-order condition (11) when , and otherwise. It does not depend on or , and it decreases in (double marginalization).
Formalization Note The case ("otherwise, vanishes") relies on the positive part in the definition of .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BrandLicensing_Intensive_Model
Formal statement
namespace BrandLicensing.Intensive
/-- (12), p. 3188: for every core effort `c ≥ 0` and royalty `s ≥ 0`, the licensee's optimal effort
is unique and equals `ρ/(2 − ρ)·[(1 − α)c − s]` if `s < (1 − α)c`, and `0` otherwise. -/
theorem eq_12_licensee_effort (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (c s : ℝ) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (hs : 0 ≤ s)
(e : ℝ) (he : 0 ≤ e) :
(∀ e', 0 ≤ e' → piLicensee P c s e' ≤ piLicensee P c s e) ↔ e = eE12 P c s := by sorry
end BrandLicensing.Intensive
Source
Bacchiega, Colucci, Denicolò & Magnani, Only the Ugly Face? A Theoretical Model of Brand Dilution, Management Science 70(5) (2024), p. 3188 (PDF 8), §4.2.2.1, eqs. (11), (12)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.